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ABOUT OUTING: PUBLIC DISCOURSE,
PRIVATE LIVES
KATHELEEN GUZMAN*
Out of sight, out of mind.
We're here. We're Queer. Get used to it.
You made your bed. Now lie in it.'
I. INTRODUCTION
"Outing" is the forced exposure of a person's same-sex orientation.
While techniques used to achieve this end vary,2 the most visible examples
of outing are employed by gay activists in publications such as The
Advocate or OutWeek,4 where ostensibly, names are published to advance
a rights agenda. Outing is not, however, confined to fringe media. The
mainstream press has joined the fray, immortalizing in print "the love[r]
that dare[s] not speak its name."'
The rules of outing have changed since its national emergence in the
early 1990s. As recently as March of 1995, the media forced a relatively
unknown person from the closet.6 The polemic engendered by outing
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. J.D. University of
Arkansas School of Law (1991); LL.M. Yale Law School (1992). I appreciate the comments and
suggestions of Paul Gewirtz, Don Judges, Mark Killenbeck, Judith Maute, and Rhonda Rivera, and offer
special thanks to Bill Foster and Rod Smolla for their continued inspiration, encouragement, and
support. Peter X. Cergizan, Brian Leech, Elizabeth Sperow, and Lee Sparks provided wonderful research
assistance.
. So chanted the members of "Queer Nation" during a Gay Pride parade in New York City. Out
and About, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 21.
2 E g, Outpost, another gay-rights organization, plastered Manhattan with posters of Hollywood
stars, bearing the slogan "absolutely queer." Id. at 31.
3 Richard Rouilard, Editor in Chief of The Advocate, claims that the magazine supports outing
"only in extremely limited circumstances." Letters to the Editor, L.A. DAILY NEWs, Sept. 1, 1991, at
16
4. Outveek closed its doors July, 1991, purportedly in part due to advertisers who "shied away"
Irom its controversial nature. Open Closets, Closed Doors, TIME, July 8, 1991, at 47.
5. I use the term "primary" outing to denote publication with revelation of sexual orientation as
its goal. "Secondary" outing, more common with the press, is the same revelation made incidentally
through commenting on the outing phenomenon or by revealing information that suggests same-sex
orientation. See, e.g., Bruce Shenitz & Annetta Miller, The New Facts of Life, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20,
1995, at 58.
6. Id.
1531
Washington University Open Scholarship
1532 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
transcends gay and lesbian communities, affecting a larger social context;
privacy squares off against the freedom of speech in an arena where no one
really wins.7
The issue presents a multi-faceted paradox, replete with cruel ironies and
false dichotomies. As Part II discusses, societal, personal, political, and
legal double-binds plague homosexuality: Lesbians and gay men might be
persecuted, but they do not deserve legal protection; they may be criminals,
but their crimes often go unpunished; they merit no "special benefits," for
they are just like everyone else; they suffer extra burdens, because "they
are not like everyone else." Outing reveals these tensions created by life
and law. Moreover, outing inflames and reinforces them to inflict real harm
on real people and deprive their dignity, privacy, and autonomy of vital
content and force. As a rhetorical strategy, outing is ill-suited to combat the
indignity and intolerance of heterosexism and homophobia. Despite
laudable goals, it hurts individuals and arguably gay "communities" more
than it helps.
Through that paradox, outing brings the internal flaws of both the
homosexual social construct and privacy/free speech jurisprudence into
sharp relief. Astonishingly, the harm that outing occasions will escape
redress. Part III reveals that traditional tort doctrine and analysis lack any
framework within which to remedy the harm. The published information
is either true or false. If false, the plaintiff must pursue defamation. As the
paradigm outing case presents a true statement of fact, the plaintiff will
lose. Alternatively, the plaintiff could pursue an action for publication of
private facts. As most outing victims by definition are public figures or
officials, the private information is deemed newsworthy or non-private, and
the plaintiff will lose. Pursuit of an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is also fruitless; a failed defamation claim will not
7. See, e.g., David Armstrong, Media's Role in 'Outings' Spurs Ethical Questions, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 17, 1995, at El; David Gelman, "Outing": An Unexpected Assault on Sexual
Privacy: Gay Activists are Forcing Others Out of the Closet, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30, 1990, at 66; Richard
Goldstein, Do We Know Too Much?, NEWSDAY, Aug. 29, 1991, at 122; Colette Guadagnino, "Outing"
Advocate Says Sexuality Shouldn't Be Secret to Michelangelo Signorile, The Homosexual "Closet" is
a Prison that Needs to be Smashed, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 18, 1993, at B2; William
A. Henry III, To "Out" or Not to "Out," TIME, Aug. 19, 1991, at 17; Dirk Johnson, Privacy v. the
Pursuit of Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at A21; Irene Lacher, Public Good-Or Private
Matters?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at E6; Richard Pyle, News Executives Discuss AIDS, Activism,
"Outing," AP, Sept. 12, 1993; Andrew Sullivan, Sleeping with the Authoritarians, OTTAWA CITIZEN,
Sept. 15, 1991, at B3; Stan P. Vansun, Hi Ho, an Outing We Will Go, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 31,
199 1, at D2; Jacob Wirtschafter, Forcing the Gay Issue, THE JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 1, 1991, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
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ABOUT OUTING
succeed if reworked under a distress theory.
Constructions of and responses to homosexual orientation are already
beset by internal inconsistencies, as is tort law. Applying that law to the
societal phenomenon of outing fortifies those dilemmas. Further, the futility
of pursuing a cause of action for outing under the current framework
demonstrates that Anglo-American legal conceptions of privacy are
theoretically infirm. Outing provides a valuable vehicle through which to
explore the double-binds of both schemes and their reinforcement of each
other. Part IV proposes internal legal reform to better accommodate the
competing interests of freedom of speech and privacy, and suggests that the
most potent and appropriate response to outing lies less in superficial
reconstruction of tort doctrines than in drastic societal and legal re-
conceptualization of sexual orientation and its dynamics.
II. THE SocIo-LEGAL CONUNDRUM: A PARADOX OF CONFLICTING
RIGHTS
A. Constructing the Tension
In a society with structures and inhabitants marked by pervasively
heterosexist ideology,' same-sex orientation is either invisible and ignored
or acknowledged and condemned by every major institution: religion, law,
psychiatry and psychology, education, and mass media.' When recognized,
complex identities of gay men and lesbians are reduced to caricatures of
deviant, amoral, disease-ridden, and often murderous aberrations. Psycho-
8 On heterosexism generally, see, e.g., PATRICIA BEATTIE JUNG & RALPH F. SMITH,
HETEROSEXISM: AN ETHICAL CHALLENGE (1993); RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF
ETHICS, SOCIE'Y AND LAW (1988).
The presumption of heterosexuality is most apparent in the rare instances where it is reversed. A
director of an AIDS service organization where approximately 80% of the employees are gay observes
that disclosure is no longer an issue. "When someone straight joins the organization... they have to
come out, or everyone will just assume they're gay." JAMES D. WOODS & JAY H. LUCAS, THE
CORPORATE CLOSET 57 (1993). The situation seems ludicrous to heterosexuals. This calls to mind my
experience during a discussion on outing at Yale Law School. Yale Law School Symposium, Outing
& The Debate over Forcing Lesbian and Gay Officials Out of the Closet (Dec. 4, 1991) [hereinafter
Yale Symposium]. A panelist opened by asking "How many of you are out to your grandparents?" I
felt offended by the presumption that to be a member of the audience, i.e., concerned about the issue,
one had to be gay. Yet the exact reverse assumption assaults gay men and lesbians daily, in ways far
more offensive than that which I experienced.
9. See Marshal A. Phillips, Perspectives on Homosexuality: Hypocritical Rule of Invisibility
Reigns, L.A. TIMES, Aug, 7, 1991, at B7 (commenting on the failure of the mainstream media to cover
the sexual orientation of a Pentagon official).
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logical heterosexism (and worse, overt homophobia) ensures that the private
individual will pick up where the state leaves off to invalidate or eradicate
"the homosexual."
The history of gay and lesbian communities parallels this invisi-
ble/invalid model. In the early 1950s, discrete gay and lesbian groups, such
as the Mattachine Foundation and the Daughters of Bilitis, were in nascent
stages.'0 Society was largely unaware that such groups existed and was
certainly unconcerned with their necessity." The societies themselves
emphasized secrecy and discretion lest their existence or membership be
revealed."2 Acceding to mainstream virtues of traditional family life, these
early organizations accommodated social norms to gain tolerance,
understanding, education, and assimilation in a world largely blind to their
concerns. 3 In short, they were invisible and sought invisibility in return.
When acknowledged, they were vilified and sought forgiveness in return.
The Stonewall riots of the late 1960s signified radical, liberalizing
change in the doctrine and action of the gay and lesbian movement."
Disgusted with society's treatment of gay men and lesbians and the self-
hatred that it inculcated, activists embraced gay pride and its public
revelation to "transform[] private language into public proclamation. This
was consistent with their general strategy of openness and defiance,
summed up in the slogan, 'Out of the closets and into the streets!""' 5 As
one activist noted, "[W]e'll never have the freedom and civil rights we
deserve as human beings unless we stop hiding in closets and in the shelter
10. JOHN D'EMILIO, MAKING TROUBLE 17-56 (1992); JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL
COMMUNITIES 57-91 (1983) [hereinafter D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS].
11. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 10, at 62.
12. Id. at 67.
13. See, e.g., id. at 81; LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF
LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 149 (1991). As D'Emilio observes, "the Mattachine
Foundation was originally more radical, and accommodation to social norms replaced the affirmation
of a distinctive gay identity." D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 10, at 81; A CERTAIN TERROR:
HETEROSEXISM, MILITARISM, VIOLENCE AND CHANGE 190 (Richard Cleaver & Patricia Myers eds.,
1993) (quoting Barbara Gittings, editor of The Ladder and founder of Daughters of Bilitis, New York).
14. See generally MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT
(1992). "Although revolutionary movements do not usually have a single spark, most gays believe that
June 27, 1969 is the date marking their passage from homosexual to gay. When police raided a
Greenwich village bar, the Stonewall Inn, bar patrons responded with a riot lasting through the
weekend. Stonewall unleashed the fury of those no longer willing to be victims. Soon afterwards, New
York City lesbians and gay men founded the Gay Liberation Front, and the idea quickly spread to other
cities. 'Gay Power' was born." Id. at 3.
15. Richard Cleaver, Sexual Dissidents and the National Security State, 1942-1992, in A CERTAIN
TERROR, supra note 13, at 194.
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ABOUT OUTING
of anonymity."' 6 Despite the promise of its youth, a quarter of a century
finds Stonewall and the activism that it inspired ineffective against the
passive denial and overt persecution to which gay men and lesbians remain
subject.
In the mid-1980s there was a growing feeling that the institutions that
had arisen in the early 1980s to deal with the AIDS crisis "had become
stultified social agencies that had no political verve anymore."' 7 Activists
initiated highly charged political demonstrations, calling themselves ACT
UP.
Out of ACT UP's freshness in frankly raising issues about money and politics
and power, people who were involved with ACT UP said everything that is
wrong with Gay Men's Health Crisis is wrong with the rest of the national
lesbian and gay organizations, so why don't we start thinking in terms of
making demonstrations to replace them?
Out of that group grew an even more aggressive political organization
called Queer Nation."5
Given this historical and societal milieu, the deconstructive nature of
outing suggests that it is a necessary, though drastic, strategy for change.
Outing a cultural hero or even the woman next door breaks the silence of
oppressive ideology. It forces recognition and perhaps reconsideration of
alternate sexual identities or expressions. This revelation reconstructs a
homosexuality less dependent on myth and more on truth. 9 "As long as
the overwhelming majority of the gay community remains hidden to family,
friends, and co-workers, we will continue to be dismissed, omitted, and
brutalized by others and ourselves. If I were a closeted public figure, I
would hope to be courageous enough to get ahead of this issue rather than
waiting for my name to appear in the tabloids. The personal price we pay
for hiding is enormous."20
Outing is a logical extension of the premise of Stonewall: that progress
requires visibility and collective action. The difference is that while the
16 Lacey Fosburgh, Thousands of Homosexuals Hold a Protest Rally in Central Park, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1970, at Al, A20, cited in TOBY MAROTTA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 170
(1981)
17. Cleaver, supra note 15, at 7.
18. Id,
19 See, e g., Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv.
187,
20. Phillips, supra note 9, at B7 (quoting Lynn Shepodd, former executive director of National
Coming Out Day).
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former strategy encouraged self-revelation, the latter commands it.
Proponents offer four justifications:
1. Heighten sensitivity to gay concerns, especially Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
2. Increase public awareness of gay rights;
3. Provide positive gay role models;2' and
4. Expose the hypocrisy of those in power positions.'
As even critics of outing admit its potential benefit in restructuring
beliefs about homosexuality,' it is enticing to concede that outing is vital
to gay and lesbian liberation. But opposition to outing commands broad-
based support through equally powerful arguments.24 Opponents condemn
this encroachment on privacy, arguing that one's sexual orientation should
never be unwillingly bared in a public forum irrespective of the ends
21. This justification supports the implicitly related attempt to instill acceptance of homosexuality
as natural. Michelangelo Signorile, features editor of the now defunct OutWeek, has said "[w]e're saying
homosexuality is natural; it's normal .... [I]s [homosexuality] so horrible [that] we should hide it?
How can we ever convince the public that homosexuality is normal unless we show the public who is
gay?" "Outing:" Comes Out of the Closet and Into the Press, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1990, at 20. "By virtue
of their individual and collective cowardice, those gays who remain 'in the closet' validate societal,
personal and institutional homophobia." Letter to the Editor, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1991, at A30.
22. Hypocrisy is a form of dishonesty. Some commentators refer to outing as "enforced honesty."
LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS 29 (1993) (quoting Taylor Branch, Closets of Power, HARPERS,
Oct. 1982, at 46-47 (suggesting that the only reason anyone protects this information is to actively lie)).
23. See Beth Ann Krier, Some Say Practice of 'Outing' May Have Benefitted Gay Rights, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1990, at E2. Gross states, "AIDS thus taught two lessons. First, a disease that strikes
gay people ... will not receive adequate attention. Second, people will begin to pay attention when
famous and important people are involved-even if they are revealed to be gay--or when 'innocent'
victims untainted by minority stigma are featured." GROSS, supra note 22, at 34.
24. The lesbian and gay movement itself is divided over whether sexual orientation is properly
a private or public concern and whether an individual's status affects this determination. For example,
John D'Emilio published an article urging professors to "come out" to their students, but the piece itself
states that "the decision to do so must, of course, be an individual one, made after careful thought and
with a strong support network to count on." John D'Emilio, Homosexual Professors Owe it to their
Students to Come Out, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 28, 1987, at A52. Some activists view "privileged
closet gays" as traitors, asserting that "those who participate in the gay community and then vote against
it are guilty of hypocrisy. ... Their duplicitous, devious, harmful behavior ought to be exposed."
GROSS, supra note 22, at 37-38 (quoting Vic Basile, then head of the Human Rights Campaign Fund
(citation omitted)). Others assert that "our movement should [not] be about the business of dragging
other people out of the closet." Id. at 37 (quoting Urvashi Vaid, Executive Director of the National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force, 1988 (citation omitted)). See generally Scott Martelle, Gays Pay Price for
Openness, Poll Shows, DaT. NEws, Apr. 25, 1993, at IA (citing surveys that found opposition to outing
among 60% of lesbians or gay men and 88% of heterosexual men or women; figure decreased to 10%
opposition when "closeted" person actively worked against lesbian or gay issues).
[VOL. 73:1531
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sought.25
Critics assert that less indelibly cruel methods can promote the goals of
gay activism and suggest that glib assertions of "exposure of hypocrisy"
mask the true motive behind outing: the enforcement of political control.
26
"[T]o force anybody's homosexuality into public is rather like the 'tool of
terror' that anti-homosexuals used throughout history to blackmail gays. 27
A common response to the claim that outing provides role models questions
the character of one who must be forced to reveal a same-sex orientation:
"No one can force a coward to be a hero."
28
Confronting the socio-legal context of outing clarifies the urgency of the
issue. Gay men and lesbians face constant tension with all facets of
existence: community, law, and self. They suffer friction with society at
large by living in a predominantly heterosexual world, interacting daily
with heterosexual employers, co-workers, friends and family.29 "[T]he
homosexual exists as a curiously split creature, one relegated to the privacy
of a closet and yet required to traverse public spaces in order to live in the
world; a creature not quite fully a citizen of the polis."3° This enforced
duplicity taxes those who have not chosen to reveal same-sex orientation.
They must play different roles depending on the situation,3' lead dual
lives,32 and constantly fear discovery.33 "You are encouraged ... to be
25. GROSS, supra note 22, at 49-50 (citing Nancy Walker, Yanking Them Out, GAY COMMUNITY
NEWS, May 14, 1983, at 5). Walker stated:
I understand the yearning for an honor roll composed of gays who were, or are, famous. It
makes us feel better and maybe is a selling point we could use in our campaign to win gay
rights, But if in the course of our battle for freedom we injure our fellows we disregard the
very cause we claim to espouse. I have put a great deal of my life into the fight for justice
for gay people, but if that is not also a fight for justice and kindness to be meted out by gays,
what is the battle for?
Id
26. Andrew Sullivan, Sleeping with the Authoritarians, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 15, 1991, at B3.
27. Out and About, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting Richard Goldstein of the Village Voice).
28. Id.
29. Heterosexism is so dominant that it is rarely recognized. Commenting on his first day of work
where his name was questioned as feminine, his marital status was explored, and homophobic remarks
were made, one author reflected "it didn't occur to me, not even for a moment, that my initiation into
the working world had been hostile or demeaning." WOODS, supra note 8, at xiv.
30. Debra D. Burrington, Constructing the Outlaw, Outing the Law, and Throwing Out the Law,
1994 UTAH L. REv. 255, 264.
31. As one man poignantly relates, "I can never be myself in interviews, which means that an
employer never gets to know me. That chemistry that they're always looking for is never going to be
there, unless it's artificial. So the person they hire is not me, it's someone I've made up." WOODS,
supra note 8, at 4.
32. Research reveals that impression management is extensively developed among gay males and
lesbians. See, e.g., VIRGINIA R. BROOKS, MINOITY STRESS AND LESBIAN WOMEN (1981); HOWARD
153719951
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open, to socialize with people, to be friendly. But when you get to be too
honest and too open and start talking about your sexual orientation, people
get very uncomfortable .... [Y]ou're... stuck in a bind as to how much
to reveal about yourself;" 34 "[y]ou're always walking a tightrope between
the two worlds ... hoping they won't collide[.]" 35
Bias against gay men and lesbians is reified through violence,36 the
BROWN, FAMILIAR FACES, HIDDEN LIvEs: THE STORY OF HOMOSExuAL MEN IN AMERICA TODAY
(1976); JOSEPH HARRY & WILLIAM B. DEVALL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GAY MALES 15 (1978);
ALICE E. MOSES, IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN LESBIAN WOMEN (1978). On impression management
generally, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, (1959); ERVING
GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963); ERVING GOFFMAN,
STRATEGIC INTERACTION, (1969). Woods describes the management techniques of gay men:
By necessity gay men become adept at thinking about self-disclosure and learn, sometimes
at great cost, that different sexual identities bring different social consequences. They become
self-conscious. They learn to control and monitor outward appearances, to distort them when
necessary. They learn to dodge. For many the result is a calculating, deliberate way of
approaching social encounters. One can say ... that they manage their sexual identities at
work.
WOODS, supra note 8, at 28 (discussing identity management strategies among gay males such as: (1)
counterfeiting, or actively claiming heterosexual identity; (2) avoidance, or withdrawal, vagueness, and
privacy; and (3) integrating, or identifying as homosexual but minimizing its relevance and/or
difference).
33. These fears are not unfounded. For example, a 1992 survey conducted in Philadelphia
revealed that 30% percent of gay men and 24% of lesbian women reported having experienced
employment discrimination on the basis of orientation. WOODS, supra note 8, at 8, citing Larry Gross
& Steven K. Aurand, Discrimination and Violence Against Lesbian Women and Gay Men in
Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: A Study by the Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay
Task Force (Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay Task Force, Philadelphia, PA), 1992. The same survey
showed that 76% of gay men and 81% of lesbians remained closeted at work and that 78% of the men
and 87% of the women feared job discrimination if their sexual orientation were known. Id.
34. A recent article on stress in the legal profession observes that "[h]omophobia is as deep-seated
in the legal profession as it is in the community at large," forcing lesbians and gay men into the
discussed double bind. Judith L. Maute, Balanced Lives in a Stressfil Profession: An Impossible
Dream? 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 810 (citing David Margolis, At the Bar; When a California Legal
Magazine portrays Gay Lawyers, the Response is X-rated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at B10; and
quoting Jane Goldman, Coming Out Strong, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1992, at 31, 34, 86). For example, a
Cincinnati attorney filed suit alleging that defendant law firm fired him because he was gay and because
of his pro bono work supporting retention of a city Human Rights Ordinance protecting gay men and
lesbians. Greenwood v. Taft, 1995 WL 540221 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1995). Although the court
ruled against plaintiff on his wrongful termination claim, his action for invasion of privacy was
preserved on appeal. Id.
35. WOODS, supra note 8, at 111.
36. The stories are countless and real. On October 30, 1994, a car mowed down a gay couple
holding hands near the Castro District in San Francisco. The driver pinned one victim to a wall with
his car and shot him in the chest. Gays Assaulted in San Francisco, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1994, at
15. In August, 1993, a U.S. Marine smashed a flower pot and concrete block over the head of a
Japanese man three times, killing him, after the former allegedly made a sexual advance. Gay Issue
Raised at Marine's Murder Trial, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1I, 1993, at A10. In Fayetteville, North Carolina,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/2
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Ilogical, albeit extreme, extension of the heterosexism that pervades
American society."'37 This ever-present brutality3s has abated little since
1986 when a United States House of Representatives subcommittee
convened a public hearing to address the rampant violence faced by gay
and lesbian citizens. 3' Over half of socially active lesbians and gay men
experience violence;4" the rate of anti-gay and lesbian violence is
a soldier entered a restaurant on August 6, 1993, shouting "I'll show you about gays in the military"
before opening fire on the patrons. Four died, seven others were wounded. Army Sergeant on Rampage
Kills 4, Hurts 7, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at A20. In Humboldt, Nebraska, local authorities publicized
that a community member known as a man had been born female. Within days, the woman was
stripped, kidnapped, and sexually assaulted by two local men who were not arrested. A week later, they
murdered her. Roger Worthington, Deadly Deception. Teena Brandon 's Double Life May Have Led to
a Triple Murder, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 17, 1994, at Cl. In Laguna Beach, California, three teenagers attacked
a 55-year-old man so viciously that hospital personnel could not identify his race. One perpetrator
admitted to having set out to "beat up some fags." Dianne Klein, When We Bleed from Hatred's
W4'ounds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993, at E3. In Woodhaven, Michigan, a man hiding in a lesbian
woman's car punched her and raped her twice; during the two-hour attack, he intoned "This should
teach you not to be a queer .... It's wrong .... This is what you need." NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN
TASK FORCE POLICY INST., ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, VICTIMIZATION, & DEFAMATION IN 1993
23 (1994) (citing HERITAGE NEWSPAPER (Woodhaven, Mich.), Dec. 1, 1993)) [hereinafter ANTI-
GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE].
37 Gregory M. Herek, The Context of Anti-Gay Violence: Notes on Cultural and Psychological
Heterosexism, in A CERTAIN TERROR, supra note 16, at 221.
38 Many states imposed the death penalty for sodomy in the early nineteenth century. GARY
DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 8, 14-20 (1991).
39. Committee on the Judiciarn, Anti-gay violence: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives (Serial No. 132) Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office; Committee on the Judiciary, Anti-gay Violence: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 702. S. 797 and S. 2000 (Serial No. J-100-
79) Wash., D.C. Government Printing Office (1989).
Data reported under the Hate Crimes Statistics Act reveals that approximately 10% of the hate
crimes reported in 1991 and 1992 were motivated by sexual orientation. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann Pastore eds., 1994).
28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV. 1992) mandates gathering statistics on hate crimes. Of the 34 states having
enacted such legislation as of 1993, 22 include sexual orientation as a basis for data collection or
enhanced penalties: See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181b(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
ch 877.19 (Harrison 1994); IOWA CODE § 729A.1-A.2 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 22, § 16 (West
1990 & Supp. 1994); MiIN. STAT. § 626.5531 (1983 & Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6
(1994 Supp.); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-21(a), 2C: 12-1(E), 2C:33-4(d), 2C:44-3(E) (1986)); OR. REV.
STAT. § 181.550 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28-46 (1956 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
1455 (1974 & Supp. 1994).
40. See CoMSOCK, supra note 38, at 31-37. See generally Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice,
and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (J. Gonsiorek & J. Weingrick eds., 1991). In 1993, 1,813 anti-gay incidents were
documented in 6 cities alone. ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, supra note 36, at 7.
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disproportionately (possibly 400%)4' higher than the rate of criminal
violence experienced by the general population.42 Further, gay or lesbian
homicide victims are "more apt to be stabbed a dozen or more times,
mutilated, and strangled, [and] in a number of instances stabbed or
mutilated after being fatally shot."4 Apparently, the violence is often
executed by those bearing a duty to protect: the police.' AIDS and HIV
compound the problem as "gay men in particular have been victims of
random violent acts "that are indicative of a society that is not reacting
rationally to the epidemic."'4 "Violence against individual gay men and
lesbians-on the streets, in the workplace, at home-is a structural feature
of life in American society."46 It is doubtful that will soon change.47
Some argue that the law, which both shapes and reflects society,
aggravates the tension by constructing the gay or lesbian persona' and
condemning it to invisible, criminal, outlaw, or "other" status.49 Further,
41. Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: A Theoretical & Practical Overview, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
165, 166 (1992) (citing PETER FINN & TAYLOR MCNEIL, RESEARCH APPLICATION REVIEW: THE
RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO BIAS CRIME (1987)).
42. COMSTOCK, supra note 38, at 55. The numbers are probably more devastating given problems
with under-reporting or official refusal to characterize a crime as motivated by sexual orientation. See
id., app. C at 158 (The Police as Perpetrators); see also ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VIOLENCE, supra note 36.
43. COMSTOCK, supra note 38, at 47 (citing Brian Miller & Laud Humphreys, Lifestyles &
Violence: Homosexual Victims of Assault and Murder, 3 QUALITATIVE SOC'Y 169, 179-80 (1980)
(statistical analysis of homicides of homosexual victims between 1973 and 1977 conducted by Miller
and Humphreys)).
44. Id. at 12-24, 152-62. See also Donna Minkowitz, Murder will Out, But it's Still Open Season
on Gays, in A CERTAIN TERROR, supra note 13, at 234.
45. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, FINAL
REPORT 140 (June 1988).
46. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1431, 1464 (1992).
47. See David A. Avila, Hate Crimes Rose 25% in 1992, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993,
at BI (citing study conducted by Hate Crime Network in Orange County revealing that homosexual
persons are the third group most likely to be victimized).
48. See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
(1992); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in
the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
49. One commentator proposes that excluding "sexual orientation" from hate crime statutes not
only casts homosexuals as criminal but also "invisible"-identifiable, yet not important enough to
deserve protection. Dan Danielsen, Law and Violence, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 247, 249-50. Similarly,
Professor Sylvia Law notes that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reflects and reinforces
negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, and that ostracism is perhaps more injurious than open
contempt and hostility. Law, supra note 19, at 192-94.
Characterizing gay men and lesbian women as a single, identifiable group troubles some of its
"members" in casting them as one-dimensional, solely defined by orientation. Ironically, convincing a
court or legislature to accord equal protection based on sexual orientation reinforces the myth, causing
gained ground on the legal front to be offset by reinforced stereotypes on the other. See Danielsen,
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legal positions taken with respect to homosexuality may not only
legitimize 0 but latently invite individual violence against gay men and
lesbians." Professor Kendall Thomas argues that "a close examination of
the political terror directed against gay men and lesbians suggests that the
relationship between homosexual sodomy laws and homophobic violence
is not merely coincident, but coordinate: the criminalization of homosexual
sodomy and criminal attacks on gay men and lesbians work in tandem."52
Whether the law's role in physical violence is active or passive, it doubly
stigmatizes that "group" and its "members" by denying rights and
protection with one hand and bestowing onus with the other. "The legal
penalties imposed upon homosexual people are deep and cruel, and they
enforce a pervasive social censure." 3
Although homosexual couples invest in emotional ties identical to those
upra See generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27
HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REv. 531 (1992).
50. One way law passively permits violence against lesbians and gay men is through the
comparatively light sentences imposed against its perpetrators. See generally COMSTOCK, supra note
38, at 72-73, tbl. 3.15: 80-81, tbl. 3.16; 84-87, tls. 3.17-3.18. For example, in 1972, six members of
the Gay Activist Alliance distributed leaflets critical of media oppression at a press banquet. As they
were leaving, the president of the Uniformed Fireman's Association led an assault against them. Despite
uncontested testimony of four New York City officials, only one person was charged. He was later
acquitted. Id. at 23-24. Donna Minkowitz related several other instances of gay-bashers receiving light
sentences. Minkowitz, supra note 44, at 368. For example, in 1983, two college students who tortured
a gay man with a knife to his testicles were sentenced to 400 hours of community service. In 1986, after
purportedly being propositioned, a defendant who beat the victim until blood sprayed from his face and
then returned with a sledgehammer to finish the job was acquitted. In 1988, after the defendant was
charged with murdering a gay man, the judge asked "that's a crime now, to beat up a homosexual?"
Id
51. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 46, at 1461 ("[G]ovemment not only passively permits, but
actively protects, acts of violence directed toward individuals who are, or are taken to be, homosexual");
see also Terry Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 209
(arguing that sodomy statutes delegitimize homosexuals as people, legitimize homophobic violence, and
cast gay men and lesbians as outlaws whose "crime" often escapes retribution).
Gregory Herek, a social scientist at the University of California at Davis, has stated that "within our
society, [gay bashers] can get approval by bashing people who are disliked. In particular, lesbians and
gay men[.)" Leslie Earnest, Gays Beginning to Fight Back, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, at B2. As
Rebecca Chadwick, co-chair of the Elections Committee of Orange County added, "If you are told that
a group of people is evil, that they are out to assault your children, that what they do is morally wrong,
then it's okay to beat this person senseless because they're queer." Id. Not surprisingly, a number of
studies report that violence against gay men and lesbians increases when anti-discrimination legislation
is defeated or after criminal sodomy laws are upheld. See generally HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992).
52. Thomas, supra note 46, at 1467.
53. Law, supra note 19, at 192.
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formed by heterosexual unions, they enjoy none of the benefits of that
union. Because same-sex marriages are not recognized,54 rights allocated
through spousal or family status are impossible for same-sex partners to
attain. Same-sex partners cannot inherit under intestacy laws, are denied a
forced share in decedent's estates,5 and are often challenged as improper
beneficiaries under a will. 6 They are excluded from insurance awards,
social security benefits, public pensions, worker's compensation, income tax
benefits, and estate tax benefits.5 Same-sex partners have no right to sue
for wrongful death of a spouse,58 no right to receive compensation given
to families of crime victims, 59 no right to be appointed as the conservator
54. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974). But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993). See generally THOMAS STODDARD & PAULA ETTLEBRICK, LEGALIZING LESBIAN AND GAY
MARRIAGES: A CONVERSATION FOR MANY VOICES (1989); Lisa R. Zimmer, Family, Marriage, and the
Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 681 (1990).
Irrespective of whether state-sanctioned same-sex marriage is necessary or desired, cases prohibiting
it often turn on a semantic structural definition of marriage as an opposite-sex union. In typical
language, one court intones that "[it] is unrealistic to think that the original draftsmen of our marriage
statutes, which date from territorial days, would have used the term in any different sense" to reject the
claim that the right to marry whomever one chooses, irrespective of gender, is rooted in the tradition
of our society and the conscience of our people. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 & n.l; see also Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d at 589; Dean, 653 A.2d at 658. This premise is undercut by recent scholarship asserting
that same-sex unions, whether termed "marital" or not, were recognized officially throughout history
and sanctioned by the Catholic Church. See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME SEX MARRIAGES IN PREMODERN
EUROPE (1994); JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1980);
PAUL D. HARDMAN, HOMOAFFECTIONALISM: MALE BONDING FROM GILGAMESH TO THE PRESENT
(1993).
55. Except for the spouse, only blood relatives are considered distributees ofa decedent's intestate
estate. Attempts by same-sex partners to attain rights based on "quasi-marital status" will fail unless the
surviving partner can prove economic consideration to the partnership apart from sexual activity. See,
e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr.
130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
56. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PIr. L.
REv. 225 (1981).
57. See, e.g., Law, supra note 19, at 192, n.18 (1988) (citing LENORE WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE
CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE LAW 367-69 (1981)); Zimmer, supra note 54.
58. Because an action for the wrongful death of a spouse by its terms can only be brought by a
spouse, same-sex partners are excluded. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 592 n.2 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting)
("Though the majority has not directly addressed the question, presumably their position that marriage
is the sine qua non to recovery would preclude any gay or lesbian plaintiff from stating a Dillon cause
of action [for negligent infliction of emotional distress] based on the injury of his or her partner.")
Accord Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (preventing recovery to same-sex
couples does not advance the State's interest, but instead highlights the resulting injustice).
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or guardian of an invalid partner,6" no right to make health-care decisions
for a family member,6' and no right to hospital or prison visitation
rights. 2 Additionally, married couples enjoy non-governmental benefits
denied to same-sex partners, including employee family health care, group
insurance, discounted "family rates" in assorted organizations, and the
ability to hold real estate by the entirety.63
Gay men and lesbians endure opposition in attempting to adopt
children' or even visit5 or retain custody of their own children after
60. See, e.g., KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME
HOME'> (1988) (describing author Thompson's eight-year battle to be appointed as her life-partner's
legal guardian); Dena L. Narbaitz, Minimizing the Trauma: A Needfor Change in State Conservatorship
Laws as Applied to Same-Sex Life Partners, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803 (1993); Gina M. Torrielli,
Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of Medical Crisis, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220, 222
(1989).
61. Because only family members have a right to make health care decisions on behalf of a
family member, same-sex partners do not share such rights. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62 See generally John C. Beattie, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the
Protec non of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415 (1991); Torrielli, supra note 60, at 223-25
(citing, inter alia, GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 51-53 (1979)); Ruth
Colker, A Bisexual Jurisrudence, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 127 (1993) (book review of BI ANY OTHER
NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAK OUT (Loraine Hutchins & Lani Kannhumanu eds., 1991) and CLOSER
TO HOME: BISEXUALITY & FEMINISM (Elizabeth R. Weise ed., 1992)).
63 Rhonda R_ Rivera, supra note 48, at 874.
64. For example, Florida and New Hampshire have statutes prohibiting gay men or lesbian
women from adopting children. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1995) ("No person eligible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1991)
("[Any individual not a minor and not a homosexual may adopt"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 161:2IV
( 1991) ("[TJhe department shall not grant a license to any foster family home in which one or more of
the adults is homosexual"). For case law applying the New Hampshire statute, see Stuart v. State, 597
A 2d 1076 (N.H. 1991). In response to published reports of the placement of two children with two gay
men Massachusetts' policy essentially prohibits placement of foster children with homosexuals.
Homosexual Foster Parents Debated, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1985, at A24.
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington are all considering bills to prohibit homosexual, bisexual
or lesbian persons from adopting or providing foster care to a child. Graves, H.R.J. 1021, 44th Leg.,
I st Reg Sess. 1993 Oklahoma Laws (introduced to House Committee on Rules Feb. 2, 1993); Fair,
1993 S C.HB. 3649, 1993-94 (passed house, to senate general committee Jan. 19, 1994); Stevens, 1993
Washington H.B. 2398 53d leg. 1994 reg. session (introduced to House Committee on the Judiciary Jan.
14, 1994).
65. In Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 894 (S.D. 1992), a lesbian mother's already
restricted visitation rights prohibiting her from entertaining unrelated women or homosexual men when
her children were visiting were deemed too liberal. The court ordered a detailed study of the situation
and more strictly enforced limits on visitation. Id. See also Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill.
App Ct. 1993) (overturning trial court's order for supervision of visits between lesbian mother and
children by heterosexual employees of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,
elimination of overnight stays, and requirement that the lesbian mother enroll in psychotherapy).
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divorce.66 The law allows gay or lesbian teachers, military personnel,
scout troop leaders,67 or others in a myriad of professions to be fired or
never hired.6' Gay men and lesbians are denied the right to immigrate or
seek asylum in the United States based on sexual orientation. 69 And
perhaps most viciously, almost half of the states criminalize conduct
66. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (considering wife's
open homosexuality in awarding custody); J.L.P.H. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(prohibiting overnight visits); Spence v. Durham, 198 S.E.2d 537, 541 (N.C. 1973) (stating that lesbian
mother's behavior was "beyond the pale of the most permissive society"); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d
966 (Okla. 1982) (rescinding lesbian mother's custody after she acknowledged her open, homosexual
relationship); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-I, 1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988); Roe
v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985) (refusing custody to parent in active homosexual relationship
because it "flies in the face of... society's mores."). But see Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va.
App. 1994) (overturning trial court decision removing custody from lesbian biological parent). See
generally Comment, Burdens of Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child
Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 497 (1984).
The cautious hope instilled by the Bottoms decision, 457 S.E.2d 102, that law is moving toward
according lesbian or gay parents rights coordinate to those enjoyed by heterosexual parents, must be
tempered. The case was overturned in 1995, when the Supreme Court of Virginia intoned that "living
daily under conditions stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose a burden
upon a child by reason of the 'social condemnation' attached to such an arrangement, which will
inevitably afflict the child's relationships with its 'peers and with the community at large."' Bottoms
v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (quoting Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
67. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of America, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that forcing Boy Scout Council to accept homosexual scout master
violates First Amendment rights to expressive association).
68. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declaring that homosexuals have no
enhanced constitutional protection from discrimination in hiring decisions); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding private same-sex activity as basis for discharge); Singer v. U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding announced homosexual activities justified
government's denial of employment); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1987).
Apparently this is often viewed as a positive. One state legislator, debating the merits of including
sexual orientation in the state's Hate Crimes Bill, remarked:
The next step, and mark my words it will come, the next step will be to legalize sodomy in
Utah, and the next step will be to prohibit any kind of distinction based on homosexuality.
Churches will not be able to differentiate on the basis of sexual orientation in their hiring,
schools will not be able to differentiate on the basis of sexual orientation in their hiring, and
landlords will not be able to differentiate in sexual orientation in who they allow to live on
their property.
Floor Debate, Statement of Rep. Merrill Nelson, 49th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. I1, 1992) (House
recording no. 1, side A), cited in Kogan, supra note 51, at 223.
69. See, e.g., Brian J. MeGoldrick, United States Immigration Policy and Sexual Orientation: Is
Asylum for Homosexuals a Possibility?, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201 (1994) (noting the historical attempt
to exclude homosexuals from immigrating to the United States and more recent denials of naturalization
and/or political asylum on the basis of orientation). See also In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir.
1983) (declaring candidate ineligible for naturalization due to his same-sex orientation).
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through which many same-sex partners express sexuality and affirm
love.7" The denial of these rights is particularly egregious given their
personal as opposed to merely economic dimensions. In particular, sodomy
statutes reinforce self-doubt, solitude, and anxiety about remaining closet-
bound lest one be branded a criminal. It appears that gay men and lesbian
women are forced to peer out from this closet because the law has backed
them into it.
Gay men and lesbians are "the enemy."'" As our culture "oppresses,
70. The American Law Institute recommended that states adopt its Model Penal Code, which
stated "no harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in typical sex practices in private
between consenting adult partners." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 note on status of section (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). A poll conducted in June, showed that 48% of Americans believe that homosexual
relations between consenting adults should be legal; 44% thought they should not; 8% were undecided.
Larry Hugick, Public Opinion Divided on Gay Rights, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1992, at 6.
Despite these views and the fact that half the states have repealed laws regulating private, adult,
consensual sexual behavior, 25 jurisdictions still criminalize sodomy. In 16 jurisdictions, sodomy is a
felony. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6605 (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE ART. 27, §§ 553-
554 (1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (West 1990); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.158 (West 1991);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-505 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West Supp. 1994); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120
(Law. Co-op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie Supp. 1988). In the other nine jurisdictions,
it qualifies as a misdemeanor. See ALA, CODE § 13A-6-65 (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288A (West 1988 &
Supp. 1995) (applying to prison inmates); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.101
(Vernon 1979); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994) (ruled unconstitutional in State v.
Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. CL App. 1992)), rev'd, No. D-2393, 1194 Tex. LEXIS 17 (Tex. Jan.
12, 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1995). Most of these statutes apply only to homosexual
conduct. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (West 1990).
71. Gay men and lesbians, along with witches, satanists, communists, and Jews, have borne
society's characterization as the "enemy." Dr. Mel White, dean of the Cathedral of Hope and a former
writer for the Revs. Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, comments on this phenomenon. Suggesting that
homosexuality did not become a priority for the religious right until the fall of the Soviet Union, he
asserts that "[tIhey needed a new enemy to keep their troops moving[.] You can almost take out the
term 'Evil Empire' and stick in 'queer."' David Jackson, Anti-Gay Comments Spark Fast, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 3, 1995, at A19. See also DIDI HERMAN, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: STRUGGLES FOR
LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL EQUALITY 90 (1994) (noting historical enemies, including "the association
of Jewish men with effeminacy, or the articulation of communists with homosexuals and Jews during
the McCarthy witch-hunts," and averring that much anti homosexual rhetoric is directly traceable to
Christian anti semitism). In fact, society often conflates enemy groups to create a double mythical evil,
such as the homosexual communist and the lesbian witch. GROSS, supra note 22, at 12. See generally
SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS
(1985); SANDER L. GILMAN, DISEASE AND REPRESENTATION: IMAGES OF ILLNESS FROM MADNESS TO
AIDS (1988); Lee Edelman, Tearooms and Sympathy, or, the Epistemology of the Water Closet, in
NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES (Andrew Parker et al. eds., 1992); John D'Emilio, The Homosexual
Washington University Open Scholarship
1546 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 73:1531
penalizes, or stigmatizes all forms of homosexuality,"' it is unsurprising
that for many gay men or lesbians, the choice to openly assert sexual
orientation in a heterosexual society is often not voluntarily made.13 Law
is codified or institutionalized policy, text and subtext. Eliminating legal
impediments to, or at least persecution of, homosexuality would reduce the
violence inflicted against a substantial proportion of our friends, family, and
selves. 74
Outing aggravates these ubiquitous tensions. Ironically, its potential
victims now find no sanctuary from the pressures of a heterosexist society
within communities that traditionally have championed broad privacy
rights: to refuse mandatory AIDS testing and limit access to results;75 to
Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, in SEXUALITY IN HISTORY, PASSION AND
POWER (Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989).
72. JOHN E. BOSWELL, JEWS, BICYCLE RIDERS & GAY PEOPLE: THE DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL
CONSENSUS AND ITS IMPACT ON MINORITIES 224 (1989).
73. For example, lesbians and gay men are attacked more frequently where they are most
identifiable, for example in a gay neighborhood or bar or when they are with a lover. COMSTOCK, supra
note 38, at 53.
74. An often-cited statistic asserts that 10% of male Americans were primarily homosexual and
that many more have had at least one homosexual encounter. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 651 (1948). A more recent and comprehensive empirical study
estimates that 25 million Americans are primarily homosexual. William Paul, Social Issues attd
HomosexualBehavior: A Taxonomy of Categories and Themes in Anti-Gay Argument, in HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES (William Paul et al. eds., 1982).
75. AIDS activists have voiced opposition to mandatory testing schemes, patient disclosure
obligations, and practice restrictions as "Orwellian" invasions of privacy. Nina Bernstein, Death by
Silence: A Failure to Notify Costs Lives, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 1993, at 7; see also Leonard H. Glantz et
al., Risky Business: Setting Public Health Policy for HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals, 70
MILBANK Q. 43 (1992); Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Public Policy,
Discrimination and Patient Safety, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 303 (1990). See generally Allyn L.
Taylor & Barry R. Furrow, AIDS and the Health Care Provider, in AIDS AND THE LAW J-1 (American
Bar Association Division for Professional Education ed., 1994). AIDS patients and support groups are
particularly reluctant to relinquish such information to such federal agencies as the Centers for Disease
Control. As Michael Callen, co-founder of Gay Men With AIDS, asserts "the government shows up and
asks whether you use drugs, asks whether you've been a prostitute, asks whether you're gay, asks
whether you have sex with animals. We have absolutely no control over the dissemination of this
sensitive information." Barton Gellman, Tracing AIDS Cases Raises Privacy Issue, WASH. POST, July
18, 1983, at 01. Virginia Apuzzo, executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
("NGLTF"), states:
In this country we are illegal in half of the states, we can't serve in the armed forces, we can't
raise our own kids in many states and we sure as hell can't teach other people's kids. When
you tell us you're interested in our Social Security numbers when we know we're not
permitted to have security clearances ... we would be naive at best not to ask "what will you
do with that information?"
Id. The concern is appreciable, particularly in light of the revelation that the FBI once kept files on
alleged homosexual persons titled "Sex Degenerates and Sex Offenders," "Sex Perverts in Government
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engage in consensual sexual activity;76 to bear and rear children;" to
marry;7" to keep private things private. 9 With the advent of outing arises
an iconoclastic faction determined to advance personal or (perceived) group
goals through the sacrifice of individual privacy 0 Richard Mohr observes:
[T]he presumption that every gay person will keep every other gay person's
identity secret from the public is a convention and not merely a rule. Any
field anthropologist examining the folkways of the gay community would
easily notice that among all the variety in the gay community-just for
starters divisions of life-styles between lesbians and gay men-The Secret is
the social convention that most centrally defines the community.8'
Serice," and "Sex Offenders," and shared its findings with executive agencies and universities. See FBI
"Sex Deviate " Hunt Revealed Files Alleged Adlal Stevenson Was a Homosexual, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan.
13. 1991, at Al.
While a 1991 Newsweek poll demonstrated that 94% of those questioned believed that HIV-infected
physicians and dentists should be forced to disclose their health status to their patients, gay rights
activ ists including the National Association of People with AIDS, the Stonewall Committee for Lesbian-
Gay Rights, and the legislative director for the ACLU, decried as a threat to privacy a measure proposed
in 1989 that would allow doctors and health care officials to exchange information about AIDS patients.
Public Opinion Supports Limiting Practice, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 48. They asserted that it would
"cause people to back into the closet even further." David Gering, AIDS Bill Rekindles Questions of
Privacy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 1989, at B2.
That attitude might be changing. Thomas Stoddard, former head of LAMBDA Legal Defense &
Education Fund, has altered his thinking on the issue in light of the AIDS death toll, assuming that
contact tracing is sensitive to the parties involved. See Bernstein supra, at 7.
76. See, e g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying gay-rights activists' attempt to
invoke the constitutional right to privacy to protect adult consensual sodomy). For example, in 1986,
the NGLTF launched its Privacy Project to support state and local attempts to reform sodomy laws.
Under those auspices, the NGLTF Policy Institute published the Sodomy Law Repeal Packet in 1989
urging recognition of "the National Day of Mourning for the Right to Privacy." NATIONAL GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL'Y INST., SODOMY LAW REPEAL PACKET 2 (1989). The handout urged readers
to write to local officials and confess "crimes" of sodomy, yet counseled that anonymity (clearly a form
of privacy) was best as "law enforcement officials have been known to compose lists or suspected or
identified homosexuals." Id. at 5.
77. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
79. Gay and/or lesbian interest groups have filed amicus curiae briefs in many high-profile cases
implicating privacy rights. In Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, Gay and Lesbian Advocates
and Defenders, and the National Gay and Lesbian Association filed briefs to support the right of a
lesbian mother to retain custody of her son.
80. As Washington Blade Editor Lisa Keen noted when questioned about that paper's policy
regarding outing, "[tlhe allegation of hypocrisy was not enough .... Privacy is supreme." GROSS,
.supra note 22, at 39 (citation omitted).
81. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROvERsIES 29 (1992). See also
GROSS, supra note 22, at 4 (noting a "long standing agreement among gay people that they kept each
others' secrets even after they'd abandoned their own closets"); WooDs, supra note 8, at 121.
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Former confidence that group membership would remain unrevealed to
non-group members or the press82 has given way to the fear that making
one false, "hypocritical" step or receiving too much attention exchanges
private sexuality for political expedience. 3 The circle closes, and one is
reminded of the aphorism: The farther one goes to the left, the closer one
gets to the right.
Perhaps the most wrenching result of outing is the self-conflict that it
creates or inflames. Persons already anxious about an orientation that
society, and until relatively recently, psychiatry,84 labels deviant85 now
confront whether keeping that fact private is cowardly, reprehensible, or
traitorous to one's self or community. 6 Outing slices into human dignity
by stealing individual control over one's life and generating additional fear
over the legal and societal consequences of exposure.
The paradoxical nature of outing is vivid in the ironies of its existence
and the double binds that it effects. During the witch-hunts of the
McCarthy era, suspected homosexuals were targeted as often as suspected
82. As one journalist notes,
[s]ince the birth of the gay-liberation movement[,] we gay journalists have adhered to a fairly
rigid code of conduct on the matter of bringing people unwillingly out of the closet. With the
possible exception of closeted political figures who were actively working against the
movement ... it was strictly verboten, an absolute no-no.
GROSS, supra note 22, at 4.
83. For example, one writer notes a concern of closeted gay men (and presumably lesbians) at
the workplace: with promotions comes visibility. WOODS, supra note 8, at 106.
84. After World War II, state legislatures passed laws characterizing homosexuality as a socially
threatening disease. Doctors were permitted to experiment on gay men and lesbians in their wards with
psychotherapy, castration, hysterectomy, lobotomy, electroshock, aversion therapy, and untested drugs.
D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 10, at 14, 17-18 (1983). See also Robert L. Spitzer, A
Proposal About Homosexuality and the APA Nomenclature: Homosexuality as an Irregular Form of
Sexual Behavior and Sexual Orientation Disturbance as a Psychiatric Disorder, 130 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1215 (1973).
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) removed homosexuality from its list of mental
disorders in 1973. APA DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261-83, 380
(3d ed. 1980).
85. The suicide rate among gay youth is reportedly significantly higher than that of heterosexual
youth. Shim Maguen, Teen Suicide: The Government's Cover-Up and America's Lost Children, in A
CERTAIN TERROR, supra note 13, at 240. A 1993 poll determined that lesbians and/or gay men contem-
plate suicide twice as often as heterosexuals, "nirror[ing] other studies that have found that one in three
teen-age suicide attempts [are] tied to sexual confusion ... reflect[ing] the amount of ... self-loathing
[among that segment of the population]." Martelle, supra note 24, at IA.
86. Larry Gross asserts that "[flor those who experienced the 1980s as wartime, prominent lesbian
and gay people hiding in their closets became silent collaborators at best and active traitors at worst."
GROSS, supra note 22, at x. Richard Mohr observes that secrecy, not exposure, was the true betrayal.
MOtHR, supra note 81, at 11-48.
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communists. 7 The co-optation of outing turns the tactic upon itself as a
political strategy for liberation that by no means lessens its blow to privacy,
autonomy, and dignity. Those who embrace the tactic substitute the tyranny
of the minority for that of the majority and suffer the consequences of
weakened freedoms in other contexts. But who is really the "evil" party?
Society, for marginalizing lesbian women and gay men; the outers, for
using drastic measures to dismantle the hegemony of heterosexism; or
closeted lesbians and gay men for perpetuating the taint of same-sex
orientation and thereby being traitorous to a community that many deny
even exists?
Lesbians and gay men are locked into a prisoner's dilemma: disclosure
versus concealment, each bearing unique costs. The potential dangers of
open homosexuality are apparent. But the relative safety of the closet masks
the depression and anxiety caused by its confines. "Secrets can become
pathogenic. Like cancers they consume an ever-growing share of an
individual's resources as deception is built upon deception.""8 Maintaining
the secret in the closet saps valuable energy, often diverting it from more
productive activity.
Which of the two evils is more damaging? Proponents of outing assert
that secrecy is more damaging than revelation, both to individual and
community. But the parentalism of that argument marks the question as the
wrong one to ask. Whether one is entirely open about his or her sexual
orientation should be a personal choice made after an individual determina-
tion of the costs and benefits of each. Further, the choice is presented as
susceptible of only two options: in or out. Individuals can and do reveal
information in limited arenas; one need not be wholly "out" to all people
to be comfortable with the level of disclosure involved. We return to the
quintessential paradox posed: Homosexuality is invisible, but when it is
revealed, it is condemned. Now, it is condemned whether revealed or not,
merely by different actors.
Further, outing as a paradox is inherent in the dualities that comprise its
personal, social, legal, and philosophical dimensions:89 homosexual or
87. GROSS, supra note 22, at 12.
88. WOODS, supra note 8, at 106-07 (citations omitted).
89. In a powerful book, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick proposed some of these binarisms relating how
different binarisms are played out in society, especially as seen through a literary lens. EVE K.
SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990). See also DIANA Fuss, IN/SIDE OUT (1993)
(presenting a series of essays exploring and challenging heterosexual/homosexual and inside/outside
dialectics through, inter alia, deconstruction, semiotics, and discourse theory).
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heterosexual; unnatural or natural; out or in;90 self or community;
essentialist or constructionist; private or public;9 concealment or revela-
tion; status or conduct. Seen in this light, issues are reduced to simplistic
either/or propositions, forcing a flawed choice between non-antipodal
forces. The result obscures more relevant questions about identity and
privacy and impedes recognition of the middle ground, such as the bisexual
or transgendered plane between the homosexual and heterosexual poles;92
the period of emergence between out and in; the small group revelation
possible between self and communal awareness. The zero-sum understand-
ing of these ideals counsels that, despite its probable role in dispelling
stereotypes, the legacy of outing is never completely positive-it necessari-
ly harms some interest even assuming that it helps another.
Adding law to the equation raises the stakes and wraps more tightly
those ties that double-bind. There are perils to either preserving or revealing
same-sex orientation, but courts seem to create a third, hybrid category with
its own hazards. For example, gay parents are encouraged to suppress,
shield, or even change their orientation, hiding the truth from the court and
thus, from everyone, or risk losing their children. That some individuals are
unwilling or unable to deny "self" in this manner is condemned: "the
[father's] unfitness is manifested by his willingness to impose this burden
[his sexual orientation] upon [the child] in exchange for his own gratifica-
tions";93 "the [mother's] gay life was more important than her child."94
Into what limbo between self and community or between status and
conduct are these people forced?
The false dichotomies and double binds that saturate society's construc-
tion of homosexuality are mirrored in the constitutional and tort arenas in
which outing battles are likely to be fought. These arenas include the right
to privacy versus the freedoms of speech and the press; the public right to
know and the private right of selective disclosure; consequential or essential
90. The in/out dichotomy and the closet metaphor it suggests, ignore that coming out is an
extremely complex process of "managing discrediting information about oneself" Marny Hall, The
Lesbian Corporate Experience, 14 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 59, 74 (1986). Andrew Sullivan of the New
Republic eloquently dismantles the "crude assertion" that there is a "simple 'closet"' and that one is
either in it or out of it. Andrew Sullivan, Sleeping with the Authoritarians, OrrAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 15,
1991, at B3.
91. See ALIDA BRILL, NOBODY'S BusINEss: THE PARADOXES OF PRIVACY (1990).
92. See Colker, supra note 62.
93. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
94. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 639 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
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free speech;9" absolutism or interpretivism; truth or falsity; fact or opinion;
status or conduct; public figure or private figure; public fact or private fact.
As Part III makes clear, the legal structure insists upon the wrong questions
and simplistic either/or answers, essentially ensuring that under the current
framework, the outing victim will never prevail.
B. Individual Dignity and Collective Goals
Rather than mechanically invoking the First Amendment, the personal
and societal costs and benefits of outing should be weighed against the
result of allowing a tort-based action as remedy.96
1. Personal Rights, Values, and Privacy
Pluralism, multiculturalism, and autonomy are central to Western
democracy and liberal thought.97
The assumption throughout is that social diversity is the prevailing condition
of modem nation-states and that it ought to be promoted. Pluralism is thus
treated as a social actuality that no contemporary political theory can ignore
without losing its relevance, and also as something that any liberal should
rejoice in and seek to protect because it is in diversity alone that freedom can
be realized."'
Anglo-American jurisprudence purports to celebrate and advance accep-
tance, allowing members of diverse class, background, ethnicity, race, and
religion to pursue autonomy and develop as people within constitutional
confines. Society heralds individualism, moral independence, dignity, and
self-esteem with particular fervor. These constitute essential values given
the heterogeneous nature of communities and the multiple moral systems
95. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too! (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
96. One scholar noted that "[tlhe essence of a reasoned decision by the authority of secular values
of a public order of human dignity is a disciplined appraisal of alternative choices of immediate
consequences in terms of preferred long-term effects." Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an
InternationalLaw of Human Dignity, 1959 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 107, 121, cited in Arthur
S Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 661 (1960).
97. See EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 10 (1978). Bloustein states
that- "The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality as including the right to
be free from certain types of intrusions. This measure of personal isolation and personal control over
the conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of
what our culture means by the concepts." Id. at 12.
98. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM, LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 12 (2d ed. 1986).
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that characterize them. Singly or in combination, these values create a
platform upon which institutional tolerance for same-sex orientation or
lifestyles can be built. Nevertheless, the strongest conceptual base is built
after adding the element of "privacy," not only inherent in the foregoing
values, but crucial in its own right.99
As a legal construct, privacy is imprecise and fragmented: "Nobody
seems to have any clear idea what it is." ' This criticism is reflected in
the legal system's rigid fragmentation of privacy into three discrete
categories: tort privacy, Fourth Amendment search and seizure privacy, and
constitutional privacy.' Study of any of these strains might impart a
conception of privacy within a specific legal doctrine. Privacy as a
normative concept, however central to notions of autonomy, human dignity,
and pluralism, transcends all three.
For example, privacy is often defined by Thomas Cooley's general
maxim as "the right to be let alone."' 2 Roger Ingham asserts that privacy
"can only be understood in the wider perspective of the nature of social
relationships and social structure" and is incapable of proper consideration
when isolated from its context.'0 3 These perspectives overlook the
nuances of privacy by slanting it as a negative: the legal ability to erect
rights against another's actions.0 4 Such focus on third-party activity
deflects attention from the proper starting point for defining privacy: the
hopes, desires, or overall mental state of the individual who seeks it.
Casting privacy as "the right to be let alone" begs many questions: who
99. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 107
(1991).
100. JUDITH J. THOMPSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, & RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 117
(William Parent ed., 1986). See also JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, PRIVACY AND THE LAw (1970);
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1970); David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a
Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975 (1992).
101. The court has invoked the "penumbral" right to privacy of the Fiflh and Fourteenth
Amendments to protect: the decision whether to have an abortion, Thomburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1985); the parent-child relationship, Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); the use of obscenity in the home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and
the use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Generally, constitutional
privacy relates to decisions concerning marriage, intimacy, and child-birth and childrearing.
102. THOMAS COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
103. Roger Ingham, Privacy and Psychology, in PRIVACY, 37 (John B. Young ed., 1978).
104. For example, Ruth Gavison attempts to define privacy in purely descriptive, value-free terms,
as a gradient that varies in secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. Privacy, to Gavison, is lost as information
is obtained, removing the need to search for violations of social convention. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
The Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 425-40 (1980).
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may enjoy the right? Only the powerful" 5 or the weak?0 6 Is one to be
let alone in all respects, as desired, or only those in which society agrees
he or she should be let alone? Does the nature of an intrusion ever justify
the intrusion? Another paradox is constructed.
While a portion of the privacy value hinges on individualism, the
determination of its legal intrusion rests on societal norms. Community thus
becomes the enemy of privacy; 17 the media and the global village
become the enemy of individual autonomy.'08 Hixson's converse argu-
ment-that the escapism of privacy "threatens collective survival" (i.e.,
community)-reflects the narrower preoccupation with privacy as a
physical and spatial construct.0 9 The criticism of privacy as "unwork-
able" seems better placed against "legal" privacy than normative priva-
cy." " The idea of privacy must be appreciated in the latter sense before
it can be applied meaningfully in adversarial contexts.
Privacy has been defined as "a valuable state of being alone and where
others are morally justified in intruding only if intervention is for a superior
value;" ' " "a condition of a person's not having undocumented personal
information ... known by [unwanted] others;""' 2 and "the claim of
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how
and to what extent information is communicated to others.""..3 In synthe-
sis, privacy is (1) a valuable state of being alone and (2) the ability to
determine for one's self what, when, how, and to what extent personal
information" 4 is communicated. This interpretation proves far more
workable when struggling with the scope of tort privacy. First, it recognizes
105. Historically, privacy was a luxury enjoyed only by the rich, particularly where it was
measured through physical distance and space. See, e.g., BLOUSTEIN, supra note 97.
106. In contrast to the existing situation in England and colonial America, First Amendment and
tort doctrine reverse the situation, virtually precluding the powerful from enjoying privacy.
107. See Robert Post, Social Foundations of Privacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (quoting
BARRINGTON MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 267 (1984)).
108. Denis McQuail, The Mass Media and Privacy, in PRIVACY, supra note 103, at 181.
109. RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 93 (1987);
SAMAR, supra note 99, at 135.
110. See Thomas, supra note 46, at 1440.
111. Lubor C. Velecky, The Concept of Privacy, in PRIVACY, supra note 103, at 18-19.
112. William A. Parent, Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy, 20 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 341,
345-46 (1983).
113. WESTIN, supra note 100, at 18.
114. Parent defines personal information as facts that most persons choose not to reveal to society
at large, regardless of how the information would be received if known. This recognizes that a fact or
situation need not be shameful to be private; all that is required is that the individual seeking privacy
chooses not to disclose it. See generally Parent, supra note 112.
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the worth of a state of privacy"' before considering its adversarial nature.
Second, it injects a new and essential element into understanding priva-
cy--"confidentiality"-recognizing that a fact need not lose its private
nature merely because it is known by more than one person. Third, it
affirms that not only might information be private although known by more
than one, but that the term "private" also applies to the choice to make the
information known, and to whom. Timing becomes integral." 6
So viewing privacy strengthens bonds between privacy and self-
determination, dignity, and autonomy. Attention shifts from the nature and
aggregate effect of the information disclosed, the status of the person about
whom it is known, the status of the entity to which it is revealed, and the
location of the compilation, to the wishes of and effects upon the person
about whom the information is revealed. This recognizes that the essence
of privacy lies in individualism and choice.
Quite apart from privacy's inception in and furtherance of liberalism,"7
it is critical to Western culture as "an important functional requirement for
the effective operation of social structure.""' Loss of privacy equals loss
of dignity. Privacy mediates between the individual and the impossibility
and pressures of conforming to conflicting social norms." 9 Sociologist
Erving Goffman emphasizes the importance of individual control over the
flow of personal information to self-esteem.22 As communities are
comprised of parts, loss of privacy felt by any segment weakens the whole.
That debility becomes immediate when, as here, society provides the means
of privacy violation and, under the guise of the rule of law, refuses to
administer correction upon its encroachment. Privacy is apparently deemed
at least moderately essential, given the existing, though chaotic, legal
privacy framework. Less apparent is how much weight the law is willing
to accord this framework, given the ease with which challenges to its
infringement can be trivialized or defeated through invoking "more
115. Personal information encompasses isolation and loneliness (negative connotations); intimacy,
solitude and confidentiality (positive connotations), and anonymity (neutral connotations).
116. On the interrelationship between privacy, self-disclosure, and positive identity, see Gary J.
McDonald, IndividualDifferences in the Coming Out Processfor Gay Men: Implicationsfor Theoretical
Models, 8 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 47 (1982).
117. As used here, liberalism refers to the protection of political and civil liberties based on belief
in progress, the essential goodness of humanity, and individual autonomy.
118. Post, supra note 107, at 969.
119. See HIxsON, supra note 99, at 93; SAMAR, supra note 109, at 135. In fact, Merton further
suggests that without privacy, schizophrenia would become the rule. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL
THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 429 (1968).
120. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 32, at 99-129.
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weighty" goals. As Catherine MacKinnon notes, the costs of freedom of
expression, such as loss of privacy, reputation, or well-being, are brushed
aside as mere externalities. 12 1 And as J. Skelley Wright cautioned, "[j]ust
as society as a whole is benefited by each individual being knowledgeable,
intelligent, and even sensitive and understanding, so too society has a great
stake in protecting each individual's reputation and privacy."'22
Matters of sexuality are inherently private. "Whenever it is considered
that relations and acts should be intimate ones-sexual life provides
obvious examples but there are others-then these relations and acts must
also be private. Public intimacy is a nonsense."' 23 Applied to outing, this
assertion drives two points: First, whether an orientation or a preference,
the information that someone is homosexual is properly within the realm
of privacy as a "sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from
the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest[.]"' 24 Second, and
more pressing, is selective information disclosure. Regarding inherently
private information, persons should choose to whom and when a piece of
information is made public. The crucial component of privacy is thus less
what people reveal but whether and how.15 Outing is the antithesis of
self-definition.
As law defines a legal invasion of privacy as occurring when A violates
a right of B and when society deems that infringement worthy of
protection, the goals of the First Amendment and the more general values
of free speech should be identified and weighed against privacy, autonomy,
and dignity.
2. Community Values and Goals
Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press[. 126
The rhetorical power of free speech is immense. The United States
learned the pre-colonial lessons of restricted speech and institutionalized its
121. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 11, 76-77 (1993).
122. J. Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem
and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REv. 630, 634 (1968).
123. Christopher G.A. Bryant, Privacy, Privatization and Self-Determination in PRIVACY, supra
note 103, at 59. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) (stating that "sexual
relations ... are normally entirely private matters.").
124. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (Penguin ed., 1988).
125. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 123, at 68; Ingham, supra note 103, at 38-39.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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reverence for broader rights in the First Amendment. Symbolically
integrated with the triumph of democracy, "[ilt is, by far, the commonly
conceived touchstone of individual liberty."' 27 The underlying principle
at issue is the unrestricted discussion of public affairs: "There can be no
doubt that this was in a general way what freedom of speech meant to the
framers of the Constituton.""' Nevertheless, determining a more specific
philosophical scope of the First Amendment proves difficult, and little
explication can be drawn from official documents regarding its meaning.
Three general theories emerge:
1. Speaker fulfillment-The Kantian view that absolute free speech
protects the speaker's self-fulfillment and expression and allows for
the maximum identification essential to individual autonomy and
dignity. 1
29
2. Self-governance-The political theory that the peoples' reserved
rights support and necessitate free and absolute expression and
discussion of governmental affairs to give "every voting member of
the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding
of these problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society
must deal."' 30
127. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 934 (1986).
128. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1941). This approach is
important if one views the application of constitutional provisions to require strict adherence to the
founders' intent. Original intent prevents judges from superimposing personal views on the Constitution,
A problem with this approach is that actual and strict reliance on the founders' intent ignores the
dynamism of the Constitution and its provisions. See PAUL BREST, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DECISIONMAKING ch. 2 (1975). Brest presents a still-life of society by "freezing the constitution in a
conservative time, when not many disenfranchised groups had a voice," and "overlook[ing] a history
of psychological and sociological insight into the nature of the human condition." See generally Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). See also
SAMAR, supra note 99, at 9.
The opposite approach recognizes that the law or Constitution will not always provide a perfect fit
with a specific case, leaving it to the court to do so. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986);
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 48-57 (1985). Some require the fit to be a neutral
principle, while others acknowledge the political and personal nature of judicial craftsmanship to
recognize that moral judgments may direct a given result. whichever approach is taken, it is crucial to
recognize that often these theories are no more than tools to procure a certain end, often to make it
appear pre-determined. "Court decisions that might be questionable or controversial are frequently
offered as merely interpretations of the law. Judicial. .. conservatives in particular, make much of this
claim." SAMAR, supra note 99, at 3.
129. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF SELF-EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
130. ALEXANDER MEIKLFJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 19
(1948). "The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedoms of those
activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern."' Id. This view gained popularity with
the Court. As one scholar writes:
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3. Enrichment-The view that free speech need not directly relate to
self-governance, but rather, embraces the varieties of philosophical,
literary, scientific, religious, and cultural speech that enrich the
individual and the community.'
3
The difficulty of precisely calculating the speech interests protected by
the First Amendment impedes progress in meaningfully weighing them
against personal rights to determine the utility of outing. Instead of
dogmatically asserting "free speech" to foreclose legal redress of outing, the
goals of the First Amendment and the inherent values of free speech should
be explicitly tested against the invasion of outing to determine whether the
truism is justified.
3, Weighing Goals, Balancing Concerns
How does a court allocate the relative importance of the First Amend-
ment against competing rights? Should "free speech" always prevail; should
it prevail over competing concerns of equal or lesser value; or should it
give way to any countervailing concern of sufficient importance?
The first, absolutist view attracts few proponents beyond Justices Black
and Douglas 132 and is disproved by an array of doctrines that exemplify
the court's willingness to shift the First Amendment calculus when
competing rights are implicated: fighting words;133 incitement to vio-
lence;'34  symbolic speech; 135  commercial speech; 136  obscenity and
The special position that the First Amendment is granted in our system is a recognition of the
paramount importance of the free exchange of ideas to self government. Freedom of speech and
press provisions of the First Amendment are designed to remove barriers that interfere with the
exchange of information citizens need to make intelligent decisions when choosing public
officials and shaping policy.
RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE IN PRINT
AND BROADCASTING 3 (1987).
131. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 256-57.
132. Justice Black stated,
-[Nlo law . .. abridging" [means] no law abridging. The First Amendment, which is the
supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value on freedom of speech and press by
putting these freedoms wholly "beyond the reach" of federal power to abridge ...
Consequently, I do not believe that any federal agencies, including Congress and this Court,
have power or authority to subordinate speech and press to what they think are "more
important interests."
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-59 (1959). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U S 39, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (questioning majority's failure to apply petitioner's First
Amendment protections to California State Bar Examiners).
133. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
I34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
135. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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pornography; 137  defamation; 38  and invasion of privacy.'39  These di-
vergent doctrines require the court to "balance the individual and social
interest in freedom of expression against the social interest sought by the
regulation which restricts expression." 4 In 1937, Justice Cardozo wrote
that First Amendment liberties are on a "different plane of social and moral
values.''. His observation fails to answer whether the balance should be
tipped toward the First Amendment irrespective of the merits of competing
values.' 42
A concrete example of the immediate and attenuated effects of outing
enables balancing its costs and benefits. Consider the implications that flow
from asserting "Chris is gay."
1. Chris experiences non-platonic love or sexual desire for a member of
the same sex.
2. Chris is inclined to act on those feelings and to engage in sexual
activity with a member of the same sex.
3. Chris is deviant, immoral, or perverted, because sexual activity with
a member of the same sex is abnormal. 43
4. Sexual activity with a member of the same sex is against the law,
thus Chris is a criminal, a sodomite, or subversive. 44
5. Chris is a fornicator, adulterer, or a reprobate, because, by necessity,
sexual activity with a member of the same sex occurs outside of a
136. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
137. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
138. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
139. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
140. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
817, 912 (1963) (criticizing the balancing test as lacking the necessary structure for its utility).
141. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
142. Perhaps so, if the First Amendment occupies a "preferred position." LABUNSKI, supra note
131, at 43. See also Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press, freedom
of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.").
143. See Bob Bernick, Jr., Hate-Crime Bill Opponents Lash Out at Homosexuality During Capitol
Hill Debate, DESERT NEWs (Salt Lake City), Jan. 29, 1992, at B12.
Statutory characterizations of sodomy illustrate these views by referring to it as a crime "against
nature" or "public morals and decency" or a "lewd," "unnatural," "perverted," "deviate," or "lascivious"
act. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g. Cleaver, supra note 15, at 181 (citation omitted) (quoting a former Republican floor
leader of the Senate as stating "you can't hardly separate homosexuals from subversives. Mind you, I
don't say every homosexual is a subversive, and I don't say every subversive is a homosexual. But a
man of low morality is a menace in the government, whatever he is, and they are all tied up together.').
See generally Kogan, supra note 51 (discussing the uproar over Utah's attempt to include gay men and
lesbians in its Hate Crime Bill).
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marital union.
6. Same-sex activity transmits HIV and causes AIDS. Thus Chris is an
instrument of disease or death.
7. If Chris is a man, he is more likely to be a murderer and is probably
a pedophile. 4 '
8. Chris chooses to be gay. Sin is a choice. Thus, Chris is a moral
weakling and a sinner. 1
6
9. Chris is "other," the enemy.'47
10. Chris must have good ABC skills and poor XYZ skills.
141
11. Chris probably holds ABC views on ABC issues.
49
145. Many of these views are perpetuated by far right religious extremists. For example, a
pamphlet distributed by a Canadian Christian women's organization asserts that "the homosexual seeks
sex in the young age group. As he ages, when he begins to lose his attractiveness, he resorts to buying
sex ... [giving rise to] a subculture or (sic] prostitution of boys and younger men in inner cities[.]
Many homosexuals, because they cannot procreate, must recruit-often the young." HERMAN, supra
note 71, at 87-89. Herman also recounts egregious statements made in a manual for Christian activists
in the United States: "Out of all the mass murders in the U.S. over the past 17 years, homosexuals
killed at least 689. of the victims, were implicated in at least 41% of the sets of crimes, committed 70%
of the 10 worst murder sets, and were involved in five of the eight murder sets perpetrated by two or
more people." Id. at 88 (quoting BRAD HAYTON, THE HOMOsEXUAL AGENDA: CHANGING YOUR
Co1vIL TY AND NATiON 15 (n.d) (citing the Institute for the Scientific Investigation of Sexuality, a
conservative christian research facility)).
146. This view is pervasive on all levels. For example, a recent letter to the editor of a college
ne%, spaper invoked Leviticus 18:22 and Romans 1:26-27 to argue the "sin," and thus chosen conduct,
of homosexualit,. YourtVews, OKLA. DAILY, Oct. 27, 1994, at B2. See generally Kogan, supra note 51,
at 239-41 (discussing the rhetorical advantage gained by describing homosexuality as "chosen" behavior
and noting the theological components of the argument).
147 As Representative Ted Weiss, Chairman of the House Administration Subcommittee on
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, averred in 1992, "[w]ith the cold war over, a new
attack on the entertainment industry is now afoot, which seeks to define once again what is American
and what is un-American .... And from the sound of what I am hearing, gay men and lesbians have
become America's new Communists." 138 CONG. REc. E1869-02 (daily ed. June 17, 1992) (statement
of Rep Ted Weiss). See also Cleaver, supra note 15, at 171.
148. Gay men and lesbians are pigeonholed into probable skills and professions. In 1980, Midge
Decter wrote that,
homosexuals have [probably not] established much of a presence in basic industry or government
service or in such classic professions as doctoring or lawyering, but then for anyone acquainted
with them as a group the thought suggests itself that few of them have ever made much effort
in these directions.
Midge Decter, The Boys on the Beach, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1980, at 40. See also WOODS, supra note
8, at 6 (noting stereotype that gay men traditionally inhabit "creative" fields and avoid conservative ones
like insurance, banking, and utilities).
149. According to one allegedly homophobic gay man, homosexual persons are commonly
perceived as partisan and incapable of neutral reasoning on sexual issues. GROSS, supra note 22, at 17
(citing EDWARD SAGARIN, CORRECTIONS: PROBLEMS OF PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 11-12
I 1973). To be out means that one can "no longer be quoted and cited as scholars in whatever their areas
of specialization, protected by the mantle of objectivity, for their vested interest would place their work
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12. If "out" due to outing, Chris is a traitor, hypocrite, and coward, and
should be ashamed.
13. As Chris likes members of my sex, I can use Chris to get ahead or
worry about Chris being attracted to or "converting" me.
14. As Chris does not like members of my sex, I can't use Chris to get
ahead and need not worry about Chris's attraction to me.
15. If I associate with Chris, people might think I am gay.
16. Maybe I should not associate with Chris, a deviant, criminal,
reprobate, and instrument of death. 50
17. Maybe I should not hire Chris, a deviant/criminallreprobate/instru-
ment of death.
18. Chris is gay. I hate "fags and dykes" and therefore hate Chris, and
might or might not choose to act on this belief.
Even if fleetingly, the statement "Chris is gay" summons most of the
foregoing propositions and presumably many more.' Positive results can
flow from revealing same-sex orientation,'52 but the risk of tangible harm
increases when someone else makes the revelation.
Suppose Chris has been outed by a magazine with a large readership.
The effect of the revelation grows exponentially as the number of primary
and secondary information recipients increases. Chris's sexual orientation
has become a very public fact, causing feelings of alienation, violation, and
betrayal. Chris may lose interpersonal relationships or employment. Chris
faces personal danger. Chris has been stripped of the right to determine to
whom and when to disclose personal information, losing dignity and
autonomy in the process. Moreover, whether in limited or public form,
Chris suffers an invasion of privacy that does not appear to be offset by
any community benefit.'53 Instead of rejoicing in plurality and diversity,
under a shadow." Id.
150. As one statistician argues, homosexuals are disproportionately responsible for serial killings,
child molestation, and other heinous crimes; one is 15 times more likely to be killed by a homosexual
than by a heterosexual during a sexual murder spree; homosexuals have committed the most sexual
conspiracy murders; half of all sex murderers are homosexuals; homosexuals have perpetrated between
one-third and one-halve of all child molestations; homosexual teachers have committed one-fourth to
four-fifths of all pupil molestations; homosexuals are 10 to 20 times more likely to molest children than
heterosexuals. Mark Pietrzyk, Queer Science, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 3, 1994, at 10, 11.
151. The implications attenuate when one moves from "facts" about Chris (arguably, implications
I & 2) to "opinions" about Chris (implications 3 & 12) to ruminations on the dynamic between self and
Chris (implications 13 & 18).
152. For example, Chris might experience heightened self- and group-identity, pride, accomplish-
ment, relief, and the ability to divert energy and attention to endeavors other than masquerade.
153. In a limited revelation (gossip), Chris might be unaware of being the subject of speculation.
Law cannot regulate gossip meaningfully; though Chris suffers harm, the proper remedy is discretion
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differences are underscored. Instead of affirming autonomy in moral choice,
the mainstream is emphasized as the norm and anything else as deviant.
Individuality becomes the scapegoat of collectivism at the expense of
privacy.
Defenders of outing contend that homosexuality should be treated no
differently than heterosexuality. They argue that there is no difference
between revealing (1) that Male Politician had sex with Female aboard the
boat versus (2) Male Politician had sex with Male aboard the same boat.
The loss of privacy and autonomy is, the defenders contend, no more
egregious in the latter instance than in the former. While the reasoning
initially appears pristine and the point acceded, the syllogism is flawed.
Of the inferences to be drawn from the foregoing list, Situation One
suggests one fact only: Politician acted on sexual desire with a member of
the opposite sex. No one can categorically state that Politician "must have"
or even "probably" engaged in "deviant" or criminal activity; that Politician
is an "adulterer" or "fornicator" (to be sure, it is not clear that Politician
and Female are not married, as in the latter instance). One would have little
or no reason to speculate on Politician's exposure to AIDS as a result of
the liaison. The remaining inferences listed peculiarly attend Situation Two.
For instance, it is unlikely that Politician would lose custody of his children
or that anyone would refuse to associate with Politician for fear that
someone might think that he or she too was heterosexual. The reaction to
the information differs viscerally. Thomas Boswell eloquently addresses the
point:
[T]he normal person is not "heterosexual" in the same sense that a gay
person is "homosexual"; the former may or may not engage in heterosexual
activity from time to time, but hardly any information about his or her
character, behavior, lifestyle or interest is inferable from this act. "Homo-
sexual," on the other hand, is understood to be the most important single fact
about a gay person, and implies a great deal beyond occasional sexual
behavior about the person to whom the term is applied.'54
and prudence on Chris's part regarding to whom to initially reveal the information. If Chris suffers
discrimination, yet has no knowledge of the revelation, the damage is internalized. See Donald P.
Judges, Light Beams and Particle Dreams: Rethinking the Individual v. Group Rights Paradigm in
Affirmative Action, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1007 (1991).
154. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, supra note 54, at 219. For example, arguing against including
sexual orientation in state hate crime legislation, one representative fumed: "Why should we pass laws
protecting someone who is breaking the law? Is it a lesser offense to assault me than a sexually oriented
person?" Kogan, supra note 51, at 217 (citing Cherrill Crosby, Utah Committee Fails to Reach Accord
on Including Gays in Hate-Crime Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 17, 1991, at B2). The speaker's misuse
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a) Speaker fulfillment
Outers are motivated by a desire to heighten sensitivity to gay-related
issues, increase awareness of gay rights, provide positive role models, and
expose the hypocrisy of powerful gay men or lesbians. 5 These goals
initially appear valid, but weighing them against the personal and societal
cost of outing assumes the "Speaker fulfillment" standard-to protect the
speaker's autonomy and dignity-in that the outer may determine what he
or she wants to accomplish and through what means.
Generally, legal redress for outing victims might inhibit the self-
expression of those seeking to publish that a specific person is gay or
lesbian. If driven by malicious intent, such self-expression should not be
protected by law in any event. If the speaker's motivation is to force the
reconsideration of gay-sensitive issues, that goal can be met through
discussing homosexuality, AIDS, discrimination, legal reform, and
hypocrisy in the abstract. All things equal, it seems ridiculous to assert that
the outer's fulfillment in lurid reporting tactics supersedes the outed's
fulfillment in living a life that does not impinge on anyone else's
autonomy.
While the desire to create role models is laudable, pressure upon it
reveals four major flaws. First, it is doubtful that providing a role model is
ever proper justification for invading privacy. This rationale supplants
of "sexual orientation" as a synonym for "homosexual" speaks tellingly about how gay persons are
defined by sexuality. See generally RICHARD A. ISAY, BEING HOMOSEXUAL: GAY MEN AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENT 82 (1992) (discussing psychoanalytic theories of homosexuality to assert that it is
constitutional (nature over nurture) in origin and eschewing correlation of homosexuality with deviance
and perversion).
155. The progenitor of outing and features editor of the former publication Outweek, Michelangelo
Signorile, seizes upon "exposure of hypocrisy" as the keystone of his justification. A few years ago,
Signorile vehemently denounced a supposedly gay Hollywood mogul for promoting allegedly
homophobic stars:
This is a self-hating man of power and privilege who ... spends his day literally making
millions and then pumping those millions into homophobes like Guns N' Roses and Andrew
Dice Clay so he can net even more millions while they spew venom on his own people....
YOU PIG. WE DEMAND YOU IMMEDIATELY STAND UP FOR YOURSELF AND THIS
COMMUNITY AND DENOUNCE AND DROP GUNS N' ROSES.
"Outing:" Comes Out of the Closet and Into the Press, supra note 21, at 20, Signorile continued by
exhorting the reader to call and harass the individual. Id. It appears, however, that Signorile now takes
a more moderate approach to outing, as his recent book advises self-identified gay men or lesbians
come out "at your own speed and when you know it's safe." Deb Price, The King of Outing Now Has
a Softer, Gentler Message, DET. NEws, July 29, 1995, at C4 (citing MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE,
OUTING YOURSELF: How TO COME OUT AS LESBIAN OR GAY TO YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND
COWORKERS (1995)).
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collective utilitarian interests for the value in individual autonomy, an
unjustifiable result in a nation that values heterogeneity and where "the
chance of unrestricted collectivism and groupism presents a greater danger
than unconfined individualism.' 5 6
Second, one who must be dragged from the closet might lack the level
of moral courage required of a truly effective role model. Outers seem to
envision a magical transformation from shame and desire for privacy to
pride and desire for publicity and advocation once the information is
known. The scenario is unlikely.
Third, while the provision of a role model to gay youth is also aimed at
the heterosexual to destroy popular stereotypes, whether visible counter-
examples to stereotypes can undermine them is arguable. 57 A study by
Deborah David and Robert Brannon argues that stereotypes are not
individually constructed but rather socially transmitted. 8 For this reason,
Joseph Harry and William DeVall argue that role models offered to affirm
homosexuality and counteract negative stereotyping would be dismissed as
exceptions to the stereotype."9 Worse, if the assertion that secrecy equals
dishonesty is true, then exposing "closet-bound hypocrites" only strengthens
the belief that gay or lesbian people are duplicitous, sneaky, conspiratorial
infiltrators.
Fourth, outing is counter-intuitive. An outed person in power might lose
that power, neutralizing the rational (although private) perspective of
sexuality that he or she could bring to bear on society and potentially
replacing it with a less enlightened voice.
b) The public's right to know
Outing unquestionably indulges the public's access to information.
Except for the rare case, however, it is unfathomable how revealing a
specific person's orientation enriches the philosophical, literary, scientific,
religious, or cultural understanding of the audience. 6 ' Protecting this
156. DAVID RIESMAN, INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED (1954).
157. Gregory Lehne, Homophobia Among Men, in THE FORTY-NINE PERCENT MAJORITY: THE
MALE SEX ROLEs 66, 77-78 (Deborah David and Robert Brannon eds., 1976).
158. Id.
159. JOSEPH HARRY & WILLIAM B. DEVALL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GAY MALES 21
(1978),
160, Nevertheless, journalists commonly use this argument to support their publication decisions.
Remarking on a recent outing of a publishing figure, Richard Johnson of the London tabloid, The Mail,
asserted that "[his] premisel] was that it was out already." Armstrong, supra note 7, at El. A senior
managing editor of a publishing company in California has couched the publication decision as having
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broad right to know need not embrace trivial or low-value revelations . 61
The courts employ a myriad of balancing tests and could weigh the worth
of the specific information disclosed against a broader public right.
Granted, public status involves an element of constructive waiver; one
theoretically assumes the risk of disclosure when seeking fame or notoriety
and enjoys better access to the press to respond to the revelation. Activists
argue that by virtue of status, many outed persons forsake all rights to
privacy. But it need not follow that choosing acting or professional football,
for example, entails forsaking all private, personal information. Society
might ultimately lose a more precious commodity when diverse women and
men shy away from public service or promotion to avoid excoriation when
private matters inflame public curiosity.
c) Promote self-governance
Under this First Amendment theory, the speech occasioned by an outing
would be protected if it were information necessary to casting an effective
vote. This approach limits protection to political speech, under which an
outing plaintiff could maintain a cause of action upon showing the non-
relevance of his or her sexual orientation to self-governance. The easiest
scenario is where the plaintiff lacks political or official status, but the
relevance of the information remains speculative even where the plaintiff
seeks or holds public office.
The correlation between sexual orientation and the ability to serve a
constituency is difficult to discern. The first argument made is that the
candidate's potential for criminal activity (sodomy) shows disrespect for
law. This assertion of "relevance" might mask a less benign motive for
knowing the information. Prosecution of homosexual activity is ordinarily
triggered by undercover agents.'62 If consensual but criminal sexual
conduct is truly relevant, perhaps undercover sex officers should regularly
marshall evidence on the conduct of any candidate, heterosexual, homosex-
ual, transsexual, or bisexual.'63 Focus on the criminality of sodomy hides
already been made-"By the time we got to it, it was a question of whether to prevent our readers from
knowing what had already been known." Eleanor Randolph, The Media, at Odds Over "Outing" of
Gays, WASH. PosT, Jul. 13, 1990, at Cl. Some news executives have gone so far as to state that when
information is already widely known, not publishing or talking about it is a form of censorship. Id.
161. See generally SuNsTEIN, supra note 95 (arguing, inter alia, that Anglo-American defamation
jurisprudence protects unworthy parties and interests).
162. See Law, supra note 19, at 189 n.8.
163. Sodomy is defined as: 1) anal or oral copulation with a member of the opposite sex; 2)
copulation with a member of the same sex; 3) beastiality. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
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behind legality to conceal a more likely preoccupation with morality.
Recognition of the real concern confronts its relevance and avoids
renvoiesque forays into legislated sexuality.
The second argument is that a gay man or lesbian is particularly
susceptible to blackmail or poses special security risks." 4 To the extent
that this argument has merit, any risk involved is easily neutralized by
removing the stigma attached to homosexuality. The argument also ignores
that other private information which poses similar risks does not merit
public disclosure.
Finally, outers profess to reveal the hypocrisy of gay men and women
in positions of power. This connection initially commands consideration
even from opponents of outing. A significant character flaw is revealed,
and lack of sympathy for the victim vanquishes moral dilemmas over
invading privacy.
Nevertheless, this justification presupposes two potentially invalid
assumptions. Presuming that the outers are even correct in asserting
someone's orientation, one wonders whether there is such a thing as a "gay
viewpoint." While abstract generalization may be made regarding the
tendency of a group member to sympathize with in-group concerns, it is
absurd to attribute to an individual a pre-packaged set of opinions merely
because that individual is gay. One's views should no more be determined
by sexual orientation than by being Caucasian or agnostic or underweight
or female.'65 This insidious form of stereotyping demonstrates decided
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1813 (2d ed. 1987). A typical state statute provides: "(a) A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another[.]" GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984). Other state statutes
proscribe similar conduct. Missouri and Montana even prohibit same-sex contact between the hand and
genitals. Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.060 (1986); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-505 (1987). Read literally, the
last two statutes prohibit self-stimulation.
More recent statistics from the Kinsey Institute indicate that well over 85% of all adults at some
time have engaged in sexual behaviors that are defined as criminal. 2 THE KINSEY INSTrrTUTE SERIES,
HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY (David P. McWhirter et al. eds., 1990). Another survey confirmed
that of couples surveyed, more than 90% had engaged in oral sex. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER
SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 236 (1984).
164. Gross notes that popular literature of the 1950s and 1960s entrenched this theme in the minds
of the populace. GROSS, supra note 22, at 26. See, e.g., ALLAN DRURY, ADVISE AND CONSENT (1961)
(telling story of U.S. senator who commits suicide after political enemies threaten to expose homosexual
episode); GORE VIDAL, THE BEST MAN: A PLAY ABOUT PoLrrITcs (1960) (telling story of leading
contender for the Democratic presidential nomination who is forced out of the race by similar threat).
165. One feminist writer addresses this point when she notes: "When I hear statements like
'women are the natural enemies of war,' I am convinced that we are promoting a simplistic view of
woman's psyche, of our political reality[.] One can be a strong advocate of women's liberation and be
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insensitivity to individualism, lessened in no way by the "I can criticize my
sister" syndrome.
66
Second, what is orientation hypocrisy and at what level of conduct
should it be penalized? Hypocrisy is a broad term which can encompass a
range of activity: merely keeping same-sex orientation a secret; 167 actively
asserting heterosexuality; failing to vote for or affirmatively and publicly
support pro-gay legislation; actively opposing similar legislation) 68 The
(non)actor whose conduct contravenes the mythical "gay viewpoint" need
not necessarily be driven by "hypocrisy," but is equally likely to act
through privacy, self-preservation, cowardice, or merely a different belief.
A smoker who supports legislation restricting cigarette sales to minors is
no more a hypocrite than a non-smoker who does so. A woman who votes
against equal rights legislation is no more a hypocrite than a man who does
so. To assert that she or he must be a hypocrite anathematizes individuality
and accords insufficient weight to the myriad reasons that impel behavior
or decision making. Further, the stated motives of the outer must be
considered against the unstated ones. "[Undoubtedly,] the emotional pain
of the closet is also accompanied by considerable social privilege, and that
this is going to engender anger and resentment."'69
Consider the politician with a near perfect voting record on gay rights
issues. How far must she or he stray from the "party line" before being
pro-imperialist." A CERTAIN TERROR, supra note 13, at 165-166.
166. Consider the equally troublesome assertion of a "black viewpoint" and the ensuing riposte
from black leaders. See, e.g., STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY
(1990); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990).
167. As one author asserts, "[teo be 'in the closet' is to misrepresent one's sexuality to others, to
encourage (or at least permit) them to draw a conclusion that one knows is false." WVOODS, supra note
8, at 26.
168. Larry Gross extensively discusses political sexual orientation hypocrisy in defending some
outings. For example, he cites as a "clear cut case" the outing of the head of the National Conservative
Political Action Committee (NCPAC), who solicited funds for "viciously antigay candidates and
causes," targeted House and Senate liberals for defeat "partly because of their tolerance of
homosexuality," and who asserted that "our nation's moral fiber is being weakened by the growing
homosexual movemenL" GRoss, supra note 22, at 1, 28 (citations omitted). An Oregon senator was
outed by members of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) after he cast a vote they
considered anti-gay. Id. at 38. An Illinois governor was outed by Chicago ACT UP members after he
supported legislation allowing hospitals to test patients for HIV without their consent. Id. A right-wing
lawyer and one-time McCarthy aide who supported anti-gay causes was outed posthumously. Id. at 28.
A former Republican congressman was outed for supporting "anti-gay" causes. Id. A former
gubernatorial candidate who used his public position to ridicule gay rights claims as "bizarre" and who
"refused as a candidate to meet with gay groups" was outed. Id. (citations omitted).
169. See GROss, supra note 22, at 25 (citing Michael Bronski, Outing: The Power of the Closet,
GAY COMMuNITY NEWS, Apr. 23, 19YI, at 12).
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termed a hypocrite? It seems that the potential for blackmail actually
increases where politicians are gently reminded to toe a certain line or risk
exposure for their orientation. At bottom, being gay is irrelevant. Even if
it were relevant, relevance does not equal determinacy, a distinction often
obscured in the outing context. 70
d) Valid discussion of human affairs
Outing clearly fosters debate over and discussion of legitimate issues.
Following Bowers v. Hardwick,17 1 only 29% of those surveyed reported
having gay or lesbian friends or acquaintances. 72 Outing increased the
numbers, a positive given how knowing a lesbian or gay man often
transforms negative attitudes toward homosexuality in general. But nothing
suggests that outing itself is responsible for this shift any more than AIDS
or the secondary discourse that outing precipitated. The issue parallels the
debate over identifying a rape victim. Actual names do not add to the
quality of the discussion. Assuming arguendo they did, incremental benefit
is offset by the pain suffered by the individual and the diversion of
attention from the issue of rape to more titillating concerns of who does
what with whom and when. 7
3
Protecting free speech and privacy are not mutually exclusive pursuits.
Both interests coexist, though perhaps not to the degree necessary to
meaningfully respond to outing. There is always risk in cabining the range
of information upon which one can freely speak. Familiar slippery slope
arguments evoke images of rampant censorship of and control over the
content of discussion. But all balancing approaches are themselves slippery
170. In a nonpolitical context, is it traitorous or hypocritical to enlist, knowing that the government
views homosexuality as incompatible with military service? Is it traitorous or hypocritical to "reap the
benefits" of playing heterosexual roles within the entertainment industry? Although Signorile would so
assert, the argument seems riddled with subversive bias. Activists probably would not revile a
heterosexual actor who "hoodwinked" the public by assuming homosexual roles. The problem is of
supply and demand, generated and perpetuated by institutions; it is neither the fault nor the
responsibility of individuals. Assuming arguendo that orientation hypocrisy even exists, it is unclear
how it renders its holder deserving of the harm that outing causes.
171. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer a fundamental
right to engage in acts of sodomy).
172 See Law, supra note 19, at 194 & n.34 (citing Ferment in the Bedroom, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
8, 1983, at 38).
173. A ready example comes to mind. While attending an open-forum panel discussion of the
merits and demerits of outing at Yale in the fall of 1991, legitimate discussion of the issues was
continuously interrupted by impromptu staccato outings by Michelangelo Signorile. Issues were
obscured as people became increasingly preoccupied with the naming of names. Yale Symposium, supra
note 8
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slopes that the courts choose to characterize as capable of equilibrium.
Because speech is already heavily restricted, "freedom of speech" is a
non sequitur, which does not seem to lessen the perception that it is
something that every citizen deserves and enjoys. Weighing free speech and
privacy in the outing context would not entail censorship or prior restraint
any more than existing doctrine. Were one to "out" someone, the results
would be similar to defamation. The offending statement would not be
censored; the speaker merely would bear the risk that the outing victim
would sue. This seems a fair bargain. Concern over whether curbing outing
necessitates loss of speech rights implicitly ranks free speech above
privacy. While the thought of censorship gone mad is distressing, it is
unclear that total loss of privacy stimulates less concern. Moreover,
protecting privacy ultimately protects free speech, though the converse may
not be true.
The goals of outing are better effectuated through other means. In its
divisiveness, outing weakens the community rather than strengthens it.
Outers offer up the victim as a "sacrificial lamb" to portray themselves as
purifying redeemers, able to solve the problems of discrimination. But the
victim is of the same group as the perpetrator or redeemer, which in the
public eye reinforces negative stereotypes about homosexual persons and
paints them as either cowardly or as willing to superordinate personal
agendas to the privacy of others. The movement lacks the purity of method
that characterized the civil rights protests of the 1960s. 74 The result is an
image of the outers (and thus, gay men and lesbians) as tantrum-throwing,
intellectually dishonest egotists. The proper response to discrimination and
AIDS, the crises of our age, exists in advocacy, education, and affirmation
rather than in emotional blackmail and terror. As John Stuart Mill
theorized:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, whether physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others,
174. Gay liberation is commonly viewed as commencing on June 27, 1969, when patrons of the
Stonewall Bar in New York City responded to harassment by shouts, thrown bottles, and stones. While
this was a violent act, it was a response to violence and provided a group identity at a time when doing
so was necessary to the cause.
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to do so would be wise, or even right. 175
11. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Notwithstanding the visceral sense of injustice provoked when sexual
orientation is publicly and forcefully revealed,176 the legal tools common-
ly employed to vindicate such harm-defamation, invasion of privacy, and
infliction of emotional distress-prove impotent in the face of the
revelation. Structurally flawed, these "dignitary torts" fail to remedy the
harm caused by outing by asking the wrong questions. Outing illuminates
the double bind of homosexuality and reinforces it through the power of
law.
A. Defamation
1. Current Doctrine and Analysis
Defamation actions are designed to protect reputational interests while
encouraging robust discussion of public affairs. A prima facie case requires
proof of (1) defamatory language; (2) of or concerning the plaintiff; (3)
negligent or intentional publication; and (4) damage to the plaintiff's
reputation.177 Truth is an affirmative defense.' A victim of outing
pursuing a defamation claim faces monumental doctrinal opposition, as the
epistemological construction of the tort renders it incompatible with the
issues presented by such disclosure.
The single requirement that the statement be defamatory comprehends
three concepts: fact, falsity, and injury to reputation, all of which impede
recovery. The significance of the dichotomy of truth and falsity arises in
two distinct contexts. First, as truth is a defense, a defamatory utterance
must be false by definition. Second, under the Supreme Court's decision in
175. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 95-96 (Everyman's Library ed. 1951) (1865).
176. For example, a Canadian paper recently posed a series of hypothetical questions to its readers,
concentrating on assorted issues confronting the media today. When asked whether the paper should
publish that a summer sports camp director was gay, 80% of the readers and 83% of the newspaper
staff supported protecting the individual's privacy. You Were the Editor, GAZETTE (MONTREAL), Aug.
25, 1991, at A4. This response, of course, must be read in the context of the fact that different
communities have different conceptions of privacy, liberty, and community mores.
177. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (5th ed.
1984).
178. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 558, 613 (1938).
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New York Times v. Sullivan,179 a plaintiff who is a public official or
figure or is involved in a matter of public concern must prove actual
malice, or the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.'80 The paradigm outing case, where the victim "is homosexu-
al,"' 8' would normally not fit within this matrix; defamation cases
flowing from outing are immediately divided by half, if not more. But
delving into the construction of the truth/falsity dichotomy presents
provocative issues.
The either/or nature of truth and falsity invites a startlingly simplistic
view of a complex world by suggesting that every defamatory statement is
one or the other and by implication, that labels suggest "facts."' 82
Regardless of the combinations of burdens and elements that complicate
defamation law, the end result is functionally the same. Someone-whether
judge, jury, defendant, or plaintiff-must arbitrarily decide who constitutes
"a homosexual," a word not capable of facile and superficial use. 183 This
circular approach confuses conduct with status or orientation and obstructs
most outing plaintiffs from recourse in defamation.
Many sexual histories are possible: plaintiff's same-sex encounter during
adolescence; numerous sexual experiences with both men and women; a
loving relationship with a person of the same sex. What if plaintiff wonders
about or desires a homosexual experience, but has never been involved in
one? What if plaintiff is committed to a same-sex partner with whom no
179. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
180. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court recognized the central role of the First
Amendment in a free society and encouraged debate on the official conduct of public officials by
requiring public official plaintiffs to prove actual malice-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth. Id. Justice Brennan refined this heightened proof when he stated that it would apply "at
the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
In the companion case of Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), New York Times protection
was extended to plaintiffs achieving "public figure" status through positive action placing them at the
center of an important public interest. Finally, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), applied
the strictures of New York Times to matters of "public concern," where negligent conduct is actionable
only if resulting in actual injury. To sustain presumed and punitive damages, the plaintiff must
demonstrate actual malice. Id. at 348-50. Accord Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Ine,
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
181. This assumes that the word is a fact capable of definition as "true." See infra notes 183-91
and accompanying text.
182. This is so notwithstanding Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), which holds
opinions actionable when containing an independently verifiable fact.
183. Insensitivity increases where "homosexual" is used as a noun (thus defining "other") rather
than as an adjective (thus describing humans).
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sexual activity occurs? Does the label "homosexual" describe an orienta-
tion, a preference, an activity, or a lifestyle? More importantly, who decides
upon whom the label is placed? 4 The questions degenerate to seman-
tics.' Dr. D.J. West notes the ambiguity inherent in the label homosexu-
al: "The attempt to categorize all humanity into two mutually exclusive and
contrasting groups of homosexuals and heterosexuals, a form of 'them' and
,us,' besides being ethically and politically dubious, produces misleading
oversimplifications."'' 6
Many people who engage or have engaged in homosexual activity would
not self-define as "homosexual."' 7 Many who have never done so might.
184 Traditional constitutional theory endorsed blanket protection for statements of opinion through
interpretation of dicta derived from New York Times:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact.
(ert-, 418 U.S. at 339-340. See also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding
publication of defamatory statements in a syndicated column is protected by the First Amendment), cert.
demcd, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). After sustaining defamation defendants for well over a decade, this
privilege seemed extinguished in 1990, when the Supreme Court held that no constitutional opinion
privilege existed: "We are not persuaded that ... an additional separate constitutional privilege for
'opinion' is required to ensure the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment."
Afilk,,ich, 497 U.S. at 21 (Rehnquist, C.J.). Tellingly, then-Justice Rehnquist had earlier commented
that -[it is apparent .., that lower courts have seized upon the word 'opinion' to solve with a meat
axe a er,y subtle and difficult question." Oilman, 471 U.S. at 1129.
The Mdiokovich case, which replaces the "fact/opinion" distinction with "fact/non-fact," suggests that
a statement is actionable only if it contains a provably false statement of fact. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at
2(0 Arguing that sexual orientation is not "a fact" is troubling if Milkovich is read literally.
Nevertheless, asserting that one is homosexual does contain independently ascertainable and "provably
false factual connotations" (that he or she engages in the criminal act of sodomy, for example) and thus,
appears actionable.
185. Dr. West posits that homosexuality is fluid and is often misapplied or mistakenly deemed
applicable to situations where the person had: (1) a fleeting feeling or attraction for a member of the
opposite sex; (2) felt an inclination to act; (3) was going through a stage; (4) had changed preferences;
(5) had preferences inconsistent with active sexual behavior; or (6) was ambivalent toward the sex of
the partner D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALiTY RE-EXAMINED 1 (1977).
186. Id. at I.
187. A CERTAIN TERROR, supra note 13, at 134. Prison life provides a ready example, where "men
can be respected if they [rape] other men, but not if they are themselves [raped]." Prison rapes are often
perpetrated by men who identify as heterosexual. "One hole substitutes for another in this scene, for
sex is in either case an expression of domination for the masculine mystique." Id. This idea also
emerges through commercialized sex. Some men, particularly adolescents and those who engage in
sexual activity with other men for money, do not identify as gay. COMSTOCK, supra note 38, app. D
at 163-65 (Hustlers and Anti-Gay Violence) (citing Martin Hoffman & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Social
Ittegriaton of Queers and Peers, in THE PROBLEM OF HOMOsEXUALITY iN MODERN SOciETY 252-55,
259 (Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek ed., 1963) (explaining that sociological determinants can redefine
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A recent study conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health and the
Center for Health Policy Studies reinforces this point. The study estimates
that nearly one-fifth of Americans report either homosexual behavior or
homosexual attraction since age fifteen, and asserts that "sexual orientation
isn't just a yes-no, heterosexual-homosexual" question.' It is absurd to
expect a court of law to determine whether someone is "homosexual" when
much more informed institutions, and often the individuals involved, hold
neither a clear understanding of homosexuality nor a definitive answer to
offer.189 In addition, the invasiveness of outing and the danger to which
it exposes the plaintiff suggest that concealing or choosing to "lie" about
sexual orientation by pursuing defamation is less preposterous than it at
first might seem: privacy and dishonesty are closely correlated.'
Flowing from the insensitive requirement of characterizing homosexuality
as fact is its unrealistic (dis)proof. Suppose the plaintiff must prove that the
statement is false. Traditional indicators such as marriage or children do not
necessarily disprove the allegation. Worse, a plaintiff not so situated is
penalized. To understand sexual orientation, it is critical to comprehend that
the plaintiff might have engaged in same-sex activity and yet not self-
expectations and definitions of "normal" in the context of homosexuality)). See also Thomas S.
Weinberg, On 'Doing' and 'Being' Gay: Sexual Behavior and Homosexual Male Self-ldentity, J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 143-56 (1978); Joel D. Hencken, Conceptualizations of Homosexual Behavior Which
Preclude Homosexual Self-Labeling, J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53-64 (1985).
188. Randall L. Sell et al., The Prevalence of Homosexual Behavior and Attraction in the United
States, the United Kingdom and France: Results of National Population-Based Samples, 24 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 235 (1995). The study's authors say that their results are more reliable than those
published by Alfred J. Kinsey in 1948 and 1953, as the latter were obtained primarily from Midwestern
college students during the 1940s. Id. at 236 (discussing ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948) (estimating 37% of respondents had some homosexual content) and
ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953) (estimating 28% of
respondents had some homosexual response)).
189. Note the debate over "causes" of homosexuality. One hypothesis is that homosexuality is a
third sex, determined by innate physical conditions. The opposing view emphasizes cultural
indoctrination and the pliability of sexual instinct. Psychoanalysts lean toward infancy experiences,
while social learning behavioralists focus more on the behavior and experience of adolescence. See
WEST, supra note 186, at 7; See generally Law, supra note 19, at 205 n.93 (detailing the work and
differing views of S. Rado, Freud, Irving Bieber, Charles Socarides, E. Bergler, Bromberg, C. Tripp,
Ricketts, and Mey-Bahlburg). See also HAVELOCK ELLIS & JOHN A. SYMONDS, SEXUAL INVERSION
(1975); MALE & FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Louis Diamont ed., 1987);
CHARLES W. SOCARIDE, HOMOSEXUALITY (1978).
190. See GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 313 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., trans.,
1950). In a notorious example, Oscar Wilde sued the Marquis of Queensberry for stating that Wilde was
homosexual. Despite the statement's "truth," Wilde pursued the action and even lied to his own
attorneys. WEST, supra note 186, at 131.
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identify as homosexual. 9' Such a plaintiff might be unable to prove this
fact to the fact-finder, allowing the defendant to escape liability.'92
Where a plaintiffs case falls beyond the strictures of New York
Times,'93 the defendant may raise substantial truth as an affirmative
defense. The basis for ruminations on sexual orientation are often
assailable: a shadowy insinuation, a sly comment, presence at a lesbian or
gay bar, friendship with a "renowned homosexual," sympathy for gay or
lesbian causes, one or more same-sex encounters.'94 Whether it should or
not, basing assertions of homosexuality on any one or more of these factors
discourages a pro-active conscience and intimate associations,'9 two
values as worthy of protection as unlimited freedom of speech. Moreover,
regardless of who must prove truth or falsity, fear of a public ferreting out
of personal sexual experiences might dissuade potential plaintiffs from
pursuing defamation. When the court pries so deeply into personal activity,
it blithely traipses into the same moral void that outers have entered.
The more politically charged obstacle to a defamation suit for outing is
that the statement must lessen plaintiffs reputation. Opinions diverge over
whether reputation is a dynamic relationship between individual and
community' 96 or whether it is more personal, like "property," its intact
191. Of course, this idea is not viable if the publication refers to a specific act, which most outings
do not.
192. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). The justices have indicated
that some cases will be incorrectly disposed of regardless of which party bears the burden of proof, and
have deemed that the constitutional scales should be tipped in favor of protecting free speech. Id. at
776-77.
193. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
194. The casual level at which such assertions are made is common. In an episode of Ronald
Reagan, Jr.'s talk show, the subject was outing, and one guest pointed a finger at Reagan and stated
that he knew a number of men who had slept with him at Yale. Verne Gay, Heeere's Ronnie,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 1991, at 18. Michael Petrelis, the leader of Queer Nation D.C., candidly admits
that he had no proof of the homosexuality of a victim he outed. Mira Friedlander, Being Pulled Out of
the Closet, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 3, 1991, at B1. And when Michelangelo Signorile outed a Pentagon
official in the Advocate,
[m)ost of the people Signorile quoted had only hearsay knowledge. Their main "evidence"
was that the official had supposedly been a regular customer in years gone by at a
predominantly gay Washington bar. The few sources who claimed first hand knowledge about
him were generally permitted to remain anonymous. Even some unnamed sources knew
nothing themselves but were merely quoting still more obscure acquaintances. In one anecdote
an unidentified man said an apparent one night stand, picked up in a bar, told him of having
"dated" the official.
William A. Henry HI, To "Out" or Not to "Out," TIME, Aug. 19, 1991, at 17.
195. Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justiliable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts
Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 857 (1993).
196. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 58-74 (1990).
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nature determined solely by the plaintiff' 9 7 Harvard Law School Professor
Alan Dershowitz has said that: "No court is going to say that calling
someone gay is legally defamatory, because to say that is to buy into the
notion that being gay is somehow bad. On the other hand, you and I know
that being exposed as gay can be harmful to a person."'98 A case brought
by a former professional football player nicely demonstrates the practical
implications of these conflicting views for the outing plaintiff.
In Azado v. Globe International, Inc., one-time football great Lyle
Alzado sued for libel after the Globe published that he was secretly
gay. 99 Defendant demurred that a false imputation of homosexuality was
"no more defamatory [than] to state falsely that one is... black when he
is white, French when he is Italian, Episcopalian when he is Jewish or a
Democrat when he is Republican."2 ' In support, defendant argued the
state's legalization of adult consensual sodomy and its protection of sexual
orientation under a state civil rights statute had removed the stigma
associated with such an imputation,20 ' and asserted that upholding
Alzado's defamation action would be tantamount to judicial enforcement
of prejudice and contrary to public policy.202
This theory irresponsibly evades critical distinctions between law and
community. On a temporal continuum, one is usually more or less
progressive than the other. Indeed, rarely, if ever, are public policy and
personal morality synchronous. A state's refusal to criminalize certain
conduct in no way proves that the community embraces it.
Judicial decisions in a political context often rely on acceptance and are
not necessarily driven by popular ideals.203 It is one thing for legislatures
to repress discrimination, but quite another for a court to refuse actionable
197. See Robert Post, The Social Foundations ofDefamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution,
74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 696-708 (1986). See generally Jon E. Grant, Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the
Press: Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Courts Categorical Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL
L. REv. 103, 108 (1991).
198. Pat H. Broeske & John M. Wilson, Outing Targets Hollywood, L.A. TIMEs, July 22, 1990,
at 6.
199. Milt Poliezer, Novel Defense: No Stigma = No Libel, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 9, 1991, at 1.
200. Id. at 5. One might then question just what defendant sought to gain by asserting Alzado's
homosexuality by lurid headlines: "Macho Newlywed Lyle Alzado is Dying... Male Hookers say NFL
Hunk is Secretly Gay." Id.
201. Id. (citing CAL. Ctv. CODE § 45 and Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1982) (homosexual persons within Unruh Act protection)).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLmcs 263-64 (1986).
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claims by ignoring social realities. Most Americans disapprove of
homosexual conduct.2" 4 To a substantial segment of society, the assertion
of homosexuality injures reputation and generates disassociation; whether
it "ought" to, in the minds of "right-thinking people," is entirely another
matter. The day when falsely stating that someone is gay or lesbian leaves
their reputation intact has not yet arrived. The determination of whether
reputation has been damaged is better answered through fact than wishful
fiction.
It is hypocritical for courts to suddenly maneuver to moral high ground
by suggesting that an orientation is not defamatory when it may cause one
to lose a friend, a job, a child, or a life, while asserting that it is reason
enough to administer these sanctions." 5 Most telling are the cases that
negatively characterize homosexual activity as beyond the pale and heinous,
"the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature." 20 6 The
petitioner's brief in Bowers v. Hardwick exemplifies this kind of approach:
"[H]omosexual sodomy is anathema of the basic unities of our soci-
ety-marriage and the family. To decriminalize or artificially withdraw the
public's expression of its disdain for this conduct does not uplift sodomy,
but rather demotes these sacred institutions to merely alternative life-
styles." 2 7
Archetypically, an outing victim is someone who would make a good
role model, be exposed as a powerful hypocrite, or draw national attention
to gay rights or AIDS; in other words, a public official or figure. Absent
a stellar showing of falsity, defamatory meaning, and actual malice,
attempts to hurdle the barriers erected by constitutional doctrine will prove
204. In 1974, 70% believed that sexual relations between members of the same sex were wrong;
Kenneth L. Nyberg & Jon P. Alston, Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward Homosexual Behavior, 2 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 99, 106 (1976-77). The statistics had changed little by 1992, when one study showed
that only 38% of the persons polled felt that homosexuality "should be considered an acceptable
alternative lifestyle." Hugick, supra note 70, at 6.
205. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (finding that the children of
the lesbian mother would "suffer from the slings and arrows of a disapproving society" if they lived
with her); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (agreeing with psychologist
who expressed that the practice of homosexuality is not socially acceptable, is a learned practice, and
is damaging to the proper development of a child). See generally notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
In states that criminalize sodomy, the plaintiff may assert slander per se through the allegation of
a crime "involving moral turpitude" without proving injury to reputation. And Schomer v. Smidt, 170
Cal Rptr. 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), a case that strains credulity, suggests that a female victim of outing
would enjoy presumed damages under the per se slander exception of imputing unchaste behavior to
a woman.
206. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
207. Brief for Petitioner at 37-38, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
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futile.08
2. Reconstructing the Tort
The defamation action can only apply to outing through substantial
reconceptualization of its elements and sexual orientation in general. First,
not every statement or publication need be a fact; 2 9 an assertion of
"homosexuality" is such a non-fact. Second, "non-facts" may be actionable.
Third, because non-facts such as sexual orientation elude reasoned
characterization and proof, labeling them as either "true" or "false" is
artificial and futile and promotes an "us" versus "them" mentality that
corrupts community. No independent criteria exists to definitively answer
whether someone is homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual. Sexual
orientation is too complicated to be subjected to a belittling and overly
simplistic determination of truth. The court should recognize that in the
end, the plaintiff is really the only person who can determine the applicabil-
ity of the label itself. Thus, a determination of truth or falsity should
depend on plaintiffs characterization of that information. If plaintiff deems
it to be false, she or he would still have to establish the remaining
elements: publication, reputational damage, culpability, and harm,
A less immoderate solution entails reworking burdens of proof in cases
involving actionable non-facts. The plaintiff would have more success in
defamation where the defendant must prove truth as an affirmative
defense l0 and where substantiation for the publication is closely scruti-
nized. Rumor should be insufficient; even the occasional same-sex liaison
should not necessarily define the statement as legally true. The only
evidence that should suffice is that plaintiff publicly or privately identified
her or himself as lesbian or gay within a time frame recent to the relevant
publication. In cases requiring plaintiff to prove actual malice (and thus
falsity), the court could either (a) shift the burden of rebutting actual malice
to the defendant or (b) allow the plaintiff to set forth minimal information
to meet a burden of production. Although marriage or children does not
prove sexual orientation (not much can), it does provide leeway for courts
208. Of course, the outing plaintiff who can prove the falsity of the allegation (or outspend the
defendant) may prevail on a defamation claim. In Selleck v. Globe Int'l, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985), a well-known actor's father sued the Globe for publishing that he was gay. The Globe
retracted its story, settling out of court. Occasional, WAsH. POST, Aug. 6, 1991, at E3. Had the case
gone to trial, it would have illuminated the nature of the proof required to establish falsity.
209. To some extent, the court recognized this in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. I
(1990).
210. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 558, 613 (1938).
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to shift the burden of proof after a minimal initial showing of falsity.
Restructuring defamation to acknowledge the amorphous and imprecise
fact/non-fact dichotomy should recognize that where the "fact" is neither
true or false, the plaintiff should be relieved of this burden.
Placing these burdens on defendants is more equitable as it forces
defendants to internalize the cost of the defamation suit. This is a
reasonable result because the defendant has arguably economically profited
from the assertion already and theoretically is better equipped to demon-
strate its truth than the plaintiff, who often will be forced to prove a
negative proposition. Though once fearing potential failure in proving the
truth of a statement, the press and defendants in general are emboldened in
making broad assertions where the plaintiff now carries that burden.211
These reforms would force defendants to appraise more judiciously the
substance of their publications, not necessarily chilling free speech but
rather elevating it. And the plaintiff who would self-identify as gay would
not bring the action at all.
The second area for reconstruction of defamation commands tightening
its actual malice categories and relaxing its rigid conception of privacy. A
pair of Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the ease with which the
conduct of public officials or figures is tied to their status.
In Garrison v. Louisiana,2"2 defendant criticized the judicial conduct
of a criminal court.213 Plaintiff sued, maintaining that the comment attacked
personal integrity rather than official conduct.214 The court held otherwise:
[C]riticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties will
tend to affect his private, as well as public, reputation... . [Alnything which
might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. Few personal
attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance,
or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the
official's private character.2"
Criticism of an official's public performance may well affect private
reputation, a permissible result according to the Court. But the question is
more portentous in transposition: what of private action that might affect
211. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). As Professor Rodney Smolla
relates, defendants have overcome an initial reticence in asserting the defense of truth to escape
defamation liability. RODNEY SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 5.1313] (1990).
212. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
213. Id. at 65.
214. Id. at 64.
215. Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
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public reputation?
Monitor Patriot Company v. Roy 16 suggests an answer. Plaintiff, a
candidate for the U.S. Senate, sued for libel after being characterized by the
local newspaper as a former bootlegger.217 Willing to paint official conduct
broadly, especially for political candidates, the Court applied New York
Times protection by defining official conduct as "anything which might
touch on an official's fitness for office."218 The paradoxical result of these
fine distinctions is that the press might have wider latitude to discuss the
private affairs of public people than it has to discuss the public affairs of
private people.219
Public figures are similarly broadly treated. With Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts22 and Associated Press v. Walker,2"' the Supreme Court opened the
door for expansive, uninhibited comment on movie or television stars,
business-world luminaries, professional athletes, politicians,222 and a host
of other individuals surrounded by a greater degree of attention or
notoriety. These cases are a boon to the outer as people in these professions
are often the very ones they seek to expose. Under these standards, if an
outing plaintiff enjoys public status, publishing that person's sexual
orientation falls within the confines of New York Times protection.
Nevertheless, the Court did preserve room for protecting private, non-
relevant information when it adumbrated that "whether there remains some
exiguous area of defamation against which [a public official] may have full
recourse is a question we need not decide in this case." '223 Outing presents
such a case. And the court stratifies the public figure category into
"general" and "limited purpose" public figures. Broader incursions are
allowed into the life of the former; the latter are deemed public figures only
with respect to the particular controversy at issue. The court should more
critically examine the nexus between private and public life24 and thus
limit New York Times protection to defendants who actually deserve it.
216. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 273.
219. See LABUNSKI, supra note 130, at 83, 240.
220. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
221. 389 U.S. 28 (1967).
222. See SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL
RIGHTS": CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY INTERESTS 299 (1988).
223. Monitor v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971).
224. Notably, Monitor criticized the privatetpublic distinction as "syllogistic manipulation... of
little utility in resolving questions of First Amendment protection." Id. at 273. This is ironic given its
permeation throughout First Amendment and tort jurisprudence.
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Last, courts must scrutinize more carefully whether a matter is "of public
concern," taking heed to reasonably, responsibly, and sympathetically
determine the value of the offending speech to the news-seeking public.
Mere prurience, of course, should never suffice.
Adopting the second line of reform neither alters existing rights nor
unduly curtails the free and robust discussion of ideas. True speech, the
initial concern of the First Amendment, remains fully protected. This
reworking of the defamation tort permits maximum protection of individual
reputational, political, self-governance, and free speech rights and elevates
the nature and level of public discourse in the process.
B. False Light
1. Doctrine and Analysis
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis fashioned a legal right to
privacy to protect against unreasonable interference with solitude.22
William Prosser established four prongs of this right,226 of which two, false
light and public disclosure of private facts, pertain to outing.2 7 These rights
225. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
The article "is perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law review article ever
written." Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & COITEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1954).
For further discussion of the article and its impact, see Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A
Centur, Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 703 (1990).
226. WILLIAM B. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 117, at 804-14 (4th ed. 1971);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
227. The other prongs are commercial appropriation and intrusion. Commercial appropriation is
met by establishing unauthorized use of one's picture or name for commercial advantage. The action
is closer to an economic, quasi-copyright infringement harm than a dignitary one. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). See, e.g., Motschenbacherv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding the likeness of an identifiable race car established sufficient
grounds for an appropriation action); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984) (supporting an appropriation action by Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis against a fashion
designer's use of a look-alike in a print advertisement).
Intrusion occurs when the defendant offensively and unreasonably pries or intrudes on the seclusion
of the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977). While some instances might arise
where this theory would work for an outing plaintiff, its application is usually limited to actual physical
intrusion and is therefore a quasi-trespass tort. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973)
(unauthorized photography); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (hidden camera,
surreptitious surveillance, and microphone); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
195 U.S. 947 (1969) (breaking and entering); Florida Publ. Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977) (trespass).
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are well-recognized under state statutory and common law.228
The essence of a false light claim is the deliberate falsification or
fictionalization of factual events or circumstances represented to be
true.229 The plaintiff must prove that: (1) the false light in which she or
he was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2)
the defendant either knowingly or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light into which the plaintiff would be
placed." False light parallels defamation, and identical conduct might
give rise to an action on either theory.23 Nevertheless, the causes of
action are asymmetrical, and their distinctions instill initial optimism for
victims of outing.
First, the action protects distinct interests. False light involves injuries to
emotions and mental suffering, while defamation involves injury to
reputation.232 The publication is actionable if it attributes to the plaintiff
positions not held or actions not taken, irrespective of whether the
attribution is "defamatory" in its ordinary sense. Second, false light
requires that the light in which the defendant is placed be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, 3 rather than "injurious to reputation" as required
in defamation. 4 Third, the fact must be subject to broader "publicity" than
a defamatory utterance. 5 Fourth, actual malice must be proved when the
published matter is in the public interest.
The difficulty an outing victim faces in defamation proceedings
228. Moretti, supra note 196, app. at 899 (listing 36 jurisdictions that appear to recognize the
private-facts facet of the right to privacy tort).
229. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted 480 U.S. 935 (1987).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
231. See, e.g., Afro-American Publ. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
232. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 87 (NV. Va. 1984). Professor Smolla
criticizes this distinction as elusive and unsatisfactory, noting that defamation law has always served
an interest in compensation for injured feelings, and taking issue with a tort's concentration on the
victim's injury over actionable conduct. SMOLLA, supra note 211, at §§ 10.0212][a], at 10-8.
233. See Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1964). Robert Sack warns of the danger in
discussing private facts cases under the aegis of defining "offensive" in the false light arena. "In the
'private facts' context, 'offensive' refers to the personal nature of the facts and the embarrassment that
disclosure may be expected to cause, while 'offensive' in the 'false light' context probably means false
and offensively injurious to feelings. They are related but not identical." ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL,
SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 395 (1994).
234. Professor Smolla notes how the two false light claims that have reached the Supreme Court
illuminate how a non-defamatory statement might still be offensive. SMOLLA, supra note 211, at
§ 10.02[2][d] (citing Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967)).
235. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (w. Va, 1983).
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foreshadows a similarly exacting standard in false light actions. "Truth" and
its attendant difficulties interpose a parallel barrier. Still, the false light tort
presents greater political and legal potential for success than its defamation
counterpart. 6
Suppose Politician A threatens to force Politician B "out of the closet."
Neither B, nor apparently anyone else would characterize him as gay. B has
two initial legal options: defamation or false light. The considerations of
each vary. B might proceed on a false light theory as the slight against
homosexuality is less grave in this context. The implied assertion of B's
action would not then be that he was disparaged or that his reputation was
ruined through questioning his orientation, but merely that A attributed to
him actions or viewpoints not held, regardless of B's personal convictions.
Although it would seem that B was alleging the "offensiveness" of the
resultant false light, seemingly innocuous publications (such as identifying
plaintiff as a political candidate) have met this standard? 7 B could assure
that it was the mischaracterization itself and not its content that he found
offensive.
As another example, assume that a local newspaper's headline reads "B
Frequents the Black Cat," a well-known lesbian and gay bar.238 A number
of impediments could prevent B's success on a defamation claim.239
Whether a false light claim would suffer the same fate is less clear. Four
situations are possible: (1) B frequents the bar and is gay; (2) B does not
frequent the bar and is gay; (3) B frequents the bar and is not gay; (4) B
does not frequent the bar and is not gay. In Situation One, B lacks both a
defamation and a false light claim; in Situation Four, B could probably
bring either. Situations Two and Three are less easily dismissed.
As applied to Situation Three, the headline appears non-defamatory on
its face. To proceed on a defamation claim, B would have to prove by
inducement the extrinsic fact that the Black Cat was a renowned lesbi-
an/gay bar, and by innuendo that when read and understood in context,
236. False light has been invoked successfully in seemingly reputation-neutral cases where
defendant: characterized the plaintiff's relationship as shallow and sexually driven, Gill v. Curtis Pub.
Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); used plaintiff's picture to illustrate a story on child abandonment,
Prystach v. Best Medium Pub. Co., 254 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1969); used plaintiff's name on a telegram
to a state governor, Hinesh v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941); or even merely identified
the plaintiff as a political candidate, Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
237. See SACK, supra note 233, at 396.
238. Recall that outing someone need not be done directly. For example, outings commonly occur
in the obituary pages.
239. See supra notes 177-208 and accompanying text.
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defendant suggested he was gay.240 Defendant's assertion of substantial
truth could fail, as its evidence must generally conform in particularity with
the defamatory implication itself.24' The problem is that while the Supreme
Court has never suggested that defamation by implication is a tenuous basis
for defamation liability, state courts appear to deny recovery.242 The false
light claim presents fewer obstacles.
Perhaps Situation Two, presenting a standard outing case, exposes most
aptly the friction between false light and defamation. Were B to assert
defamation, he would probably lose. If B has been to the bar, he cannot
base a defamation claim on the fact that he does not "frequent" the bar.
Although plaintiffs can sue when the underlying thrust of the statement is
true but its technicalities are not, courts will scrutinize whether the
statement itself is actually defamatory and whether the "substantial truth"
of the statement is verifiable.243 As Professor Smolla posits, the inquiry
underlying each doctrinal challenge is essentially the same: Whether the
reader would think differently of the plaintiff if the literal truth had been
communicated.2" In the present scenario, the technical inaccuracy of B's
visits seem to damage her no more or less under an incremental harm
theory than if the actual statement "B has been to the Black Cat and is gay"
were to appear in the newspaper. 45
Again, B might enjoy greater success on a false light theory by avoiding
troublesome innuendo and substantial truth defenses. So at least in theory,
whether B is gay should not really matter. What does matter is whether the
notion that B frequents the Black Cat "misrepresents the plaintiff's
character or behavior," '246 or contains a "vague[ly] objection[able] ... tone
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 cmt. b (1977).
241. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 177, § 116, at 841. A related concept of substantial truth
brings to mind the debate over at which point one becomes a homosexual. Does attending a gay bar
determine sexuality? A crude analogy can be drawn to the words of the Restatement: "[A] charge that
a woman is a prostitute is not made true by the committing of a single act ofunchastity." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A, cmt. c (1977).
242. See SMOLLA, supra note 211, § 4.05(3) (citing Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185 (La. 1981)
and Mihalik v. Duprey, 417 N.E.2d 1238, (Mass. Ct. App. 1981), as evidence of the state court trend
in denying recovery where a statement is literally true but permits a defamatory insinuation).
243. See id. § 5.12, at 5-23. For further discussion of the substantial truth doctrine, see KEETON
ET AL., supra note 177, § 116, at 841 (5th ed. 1984).
244. SMOLLA, supra note 211, § 5.12.
-245. The theory behind "incremental harm" is that where the plaintiff already has a certain
reputation, no further damage to it can ensue. SMOLLA, supra note 211, §§ 10.02[5] to 10.16. See, e.g.,
Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
246. Meerpol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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or slant or balance." '247 Therefore, if B can establish that although he does
identify as homosexual, he is not the stereotypical type that defendant's
statement portrays, he may recover under the false light branch of invasion
of privacy.
The less stringent requirements for false light offer a potential recovery
theory for outing plaintiffs. It appears to "provide compensation for most
statements that might also be defamatory while avoiding some of the
strictures and absurdities that encrust the law of defamation.""24 But the
small spot of hope that false light offers is illusory. Courts seem reluctant
to give it full force, relegating it to second-class status as a failed
defamation claim.249
2. Restructuring the Tort
Generally, the issues discussed in the defamation context parallel those
raised here. The false light tort focuses less on one's standing or reputation
in the community, which considers values from the outside-in, and more on
one's standing or reputation to oneself, which considers values from the
inside-out. As the stigma attached to homosexuality wanes, the false light
tort could be an intermediate measure between an action for defamation and
no action at all, which is the ultimate goal.
C. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
1. Current Doctrine and Analysis
A strikingly prescient portion of The Right to Privacy ° captures one's
initial sense that the public disclosure of private facts would prove legally
potent for an outing plaintiff: "Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life;
and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that
247. SMOLLA, supra note 211, § 10-14.2 Though inaccurate and insubstantial details preclude
recovery the very nebulous nature of what constitutes a "false light" would seem to remove the power
that these defenses have in their defamation parallel.
248. SACK, supra note 233, at 401. As Professor Sack suggests, this maybe due to greater plaintiff
familiarity with defamation law or an attempt to sidestep a jurisdiction's possibly higher fault
requirements under Hill. Id.
249. In at least one state, the plaintiff is required to choose between defamation and false light.
Kapellas v, Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1962) (en banc). Another jurisdiction has completely rejected
the claim as too severe an encroachment on free speech. Renwick v. News & Observer Publ. Co., 312
S E.2d 405 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1986).
250. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 225.
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'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops."' '
5
This tort clearly attempts to "regulate the publicizing of private life"2 '
by imposing liability on one who publishes253 private facts that (a) would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) are not of legitimate
public concern."5 4 While the actionability of publishing one's homosexual
orientation seems indisputable, legal, definitional, constitutional, and
sociological impediments vitiate this initial optimism.
As in the defamation context, law forces consideration of and places
premium importance on the wrong questions. The first and most mischie-
vous stumbling block frustrating a private facts plaintiff is that the
published information must be private. 5 The assumption that sexual
orientation passes this first requirement to recovery is sound, because
although there is no "private information" litmus test, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts so describes sexual relations. 6 Nevertheless, the
indeterminacy of the "public versus private" distinction generates simplistic
behavioral categorizations; what might seem private becomes public for
purposes of this tort.
Privacy is elastic, susceptible of differing interpretations in different
contexts.
[W]e cannot determine whether the information ... concerns "private" facts
simply by examining the content of the information; we must instead have
some notion of the circumstances surrounding the revelation of that
information. The same information can be viewed as "private" with respect
to some kinds of communications, but not with respect to others.257
If the inherent privacy elements of selective disclosure and self-determina-
tion are conceded, what is private to one should retain that nature
irrespective of its dissemination to a select individual or group. For
251. Id. at 195.
252. Post, supra note 107, at 978 (citing Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROilS. 326, 333 (1966)).
253. The disclosure required to sustain a private facts case is greater than that demanded in a
defamation case. This is a crucial distinction in non-media cases. See, e.g., Hendry v. Conner, 226
N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1975).
254. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D (1977).
255. See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofinan 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969); Coverstone v. Davies, 239 P.2d 876
(Cal. 1952).
256. For an example of how one's private sexual affairs might merit protection, see Garner v.
Triangle Pub., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
257. Post, supra note 107, at 980.
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example, few would quarrel that divulging information to a priest or a
spouse would render the disclosed fact any less private, although known by
two persons rather than one. The law clearly recognizes shared, post-
disclosure privacy in some contexts,258 but seems less willing to concede
this latent recognition for purposes of this tort, where the court is called
upon to ask:
whether the facts in question are already known in the community; whether
the facts are on the public record; and, in related matters, whether the facts
are of general interest, and therefore not to be treated as private; and whether
the plaintiff has in any sense waived his right of privacy by consenting to
dissemination of the information or disseminating it himself.259
Sipple v. The Chronicle Publishing Co.26 elucidates this notion.
On September 22, 1975, Sara Jane Moore was attempting to assassinate
President Gerald Ford when Oliver Sipple, a bystander, struck her arm as
she was about to fire a gun.26" ' Sipple was lauded for his action. The San
Francisco Chronicle thereafter published an article strongly intimating that
Sipple was gay.262 A number of newspapers subsequently ran the arti-
258. The court recognizes that context might change a private fact to a public one, and vice-versa.
Evidentiary rules protect certain confidences. Testimonial privileges permit one to refuse to disclose and
prohibit others from disclosing confidential information in judicial proceedings. While Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 does not mandate such privilege, the law may enforce the following privileges: attorney-
client, physician-patient, husband-wife and spousal immunity, clergy-penitent, and professional
journalist. Rules of ethics further bar an attorney from disclosing confidential information, with limited
exceptions. Relevant to the present inquiry, an important factor as to whether the disclosed fact is
"private" may be the existence of a confidential relationship. See SMOLLA, supra note 211, § 10.04[1]b,
at 10-23 (citing Home v. Patten, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (doctor-patient); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (psychiatrist-patient)). Further, an actionable fact loses its private status after
the plaintiffs death or assignment, again, contextual focus. This thwarts recovery in situations like the
recent posthumous outing of a publishing tycoon and a movie star.
259. SACK, supra note 233, at 406. Lubecky has noted that "confidentiality is typically desired
precisely where people do not act in their private capacities and wish to protect the interest of
somebody." Luber C. Velecky, The Concept of Privacy, in PRIVACY, supra note 103, at 19. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
260. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
261. Id.
262. In pertinent part, the article read:
One of the heroes of the day, Oliver "Bill" Sipple, the ex-Marine who grabbed Sara Jane
Moore's arm just as her gun was fired and thereby may have saved the President's life, was
the center of midnight attention at the Red Lantern, a Golden Gate Ave. bar he favors. The
Reverend Ray Brashers, head of Helping Hands, and gay politico, Harvey Milk, who claims
to be among Sipple's close friends, describe themselves as "proud-maybe this will help
break the stereotype." Sipple is among the workers in Milk's campaign for Supervisor.
Id at 667 (citing Herb Caen, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1975).
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cle" A few articles questioned Ford's failure to promptly thank Sipple
and suggested that this reticence was due to Sipple's orientation.2 4
Sipple sued the San Francisco Chronicle and other defendants for
invasion of privacy,2 61 predicating his claim on the publication of private
facts. The California Supreme Court upheld the lower court's grant of
summary judgment against Sipple. 6 Crucial to the court's determination
was that the published fact was not private:
[S]ince appellant's sexual orientation was already in the public domain and
since the articles in question did no more than to give further publicity to
matters which the appellant left open to the eye of the public, a vital element
of the tort was missing rendering it vulnerable to summary disposal. 67
While basically comporting with established private facts doctrine, the
Sipple court engages in unsatisfying rhetorical maneuvering. It suggests that
because he frequented gay and lesbian establishments and became friendly
with "notorious" gays like Harvey Milk, Sipple left his right to privacy
regarding his homosexuality at the bedroom door.26" Although Sipple may
have left his sexuality more exposed than most plaintiffs pursuing a private
facts action, the court cannot be saying that we lose all rights to privacy by
our associations and activities. To do so creates an impermissible
dichotomy between constitutional law and tort law, as associational rights
are central to constitutional free speech and privacy.269 Taken to a logical
conclusion, the idea of relinquishing privacy rights based on with whom or
where one associates with others leads the common citizen into an
Orwellian nightmare. For example, an appointment at an abortion clinic
263. Id. at 666, 669.
264. Id. at 666, 670.
265. Once information is public, there is no liability for further publication. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). For this reason, some of the claims against "mere"
republishers were dismissed.
266. 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669.
267. The case continues by discussing whether the publication was newsworthy, and ultimately
answers in the affirmative. Id. at 669-71. For extended discussion of that particular point, see infra notes
277-86 and accompanying text.
268. While it might seem that patronizing a gay bar is a very public act, it is not necessarily
always so viewed. To many lesbians and gay men, it is a quite private arena, a place of safety and
discretion. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1551, 1567-72 (1993); McGoldrick, supra note 69, at 226.
269. The marriage union is relatively inviolate; people may associate with whom they want as a
part of their freedom of association. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)
(upholding protective order prohibiting paper from publishing list of cult members obtained through
compulsory discovery in the course of defending a libel suit).
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neither warrants nor justifies the publication that an abortion was pro-
cured.270
A cynic might assert that the Sipple court made a value choice by
imposing its views of what deserves privacy protection, refusing to impose
sanctions on the encroaching party, and thus reinforcing mainstream
morality. 27' A less misanthropic response would submit that the high
transaction costs of case-by-case privacy determinations (i.e., what
reasonable expectations of privacy did the individual hold) make that
approach inefficient.2 72 Either conception devalues privacy and human
dignity, which involve expectations and self-regarding actions. Society
profits little from sterile application of the word "privacy." Doing so is
insensitive to the modulations of morality that construct life as a choice-
making endeavor.
The second barrier to success on a private facts claim presents an
appealing, if not doctrinally pure, escape valve for the defendant: The
disclosure must be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities. 7 ' Through a contradictory twist of logic, one could argue
that neither homosexuality nor its disclosure outrages average notions of
decency. In Bowers i. Hardwick,274 the court refused to extend constitu-
tional privacy to adult consensual sexual activity, highlighting its "unnatu-
ral" nature.2 75 The argument is reversed if the practice becomes "too
natural" to warrant court-imposed sanction on its publication. Cruelly, gay
men and lesbians wishing privacy are stripped of it in both constitutional
law and tort law, by opposite sides of the same coin. It is enticing to say
that homosexuality is not or should not be considered shocking, but reality
270. One could argue that these hypotheticals do not warrant comparison to outing as a confidential
relationship is involved, but this legal status is between the particular individuals involved in the
relationship. Third parties are not bound by confidentiality to keep the information private.
271. One wonders whether the court's ruling would have been the same had the information
disclosed been something that a heterosexual "mind-frame" would deem private, such as particular
sexual activity.
272. See Post, supra note 107 (arguing that the drafters of the Restatement might have concluded
that the subtle sociological concepts inherent in the privacy tort might have rendered close definitions
of public/private dissemination as "beyond the capacity of courts.").
273 See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998
(1976); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716
(Cal. 1980).
274. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
275. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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dictates truth.276
Like common law defamation, the private facts tort is infused with a
constitutional dimension. If the publication is of legitimate public interest
or is newsworthy, it will be privileged,277 a condition conferred on the
basis of the topic itself or the status of the person about whom it is made.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,278 the "public interest" standard in defama-
tion actions was criticized as an ill-conceived invitation to ad hoc
judiciaries and was quickly overturned2 79 Although the privacy tort enjoys
no such retreat from the public interest standard, identical concerns apply.
In fact, a statement can be offensive to ordinary sensibilities and still be in
the "public interest," precluding recovery. What is newsworthy, often a
matter of community mores, is
not merely limited to the dissemination of news either in the sense of current
events or commentary upon public affairs. Rather, the privilege extends to
information concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate so that the
individuals may cope with the exigencies of their period.28
The frightening proposition is that the media becomes the arbiter of "public
interest." '' In a society and age that suffers morbid preoccupation with
276. A comparison can be drawn to the debate over affirmative action. Its opponents argue that
"one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible commitment
never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or practices of one's government-the differential
treatment of other human beings by race." William Van Alstyne, Rights of Passage, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 809 (1979). By contrast, advocates of affirmative action
assert that getting beyond racism first requires taking it into account. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and
Distrust: A Comment on the AffirmativeAction Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (1986) (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)). Analogizing to gay-sensitive issues,
we are not yet "beyond" the notion of homosexuality as deviant, covert, and shameful, and should first
take it into account.
277. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Wagner v. Fawcett Pub., 307 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa.
1976). See also Dianne Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren & Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 300 (1983).
278. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that a publisher of defamatory falsehoods about a nonpublic
figure may not claim New York Times protection).
279. Id.
280. Campell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980), quoted in SMOLLA, supra note
211, at §§ 10.04[2][b][ii], at 10-33 (emphasis added).
281. See, e.g., LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: How ATrACK JOURNALISM HAS
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLIrICS (1991); John Leo, Gossipmongering's Nasty Bite, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 29, 1991, at 20 (commenting on the public's fascination with the scurrilous and
noting that "press scruples are irrelevant now because the tone for the media juggernaut is set by those
who have none').
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the sexual activity of its constituents, "of interest to the public" should not
be tantamount to "of public interest" or no one would be safe from the
prurient delving of modem Philistines.282
This all suggests that a public official or figure has virtually no right of
privacy if the facts remotely relate to public life.283 Courts view such
individuals "as having only extremely attenuated claims to information
preserves[.] [I]t is profoundly unlikely that courts will intervene to decide
what information may or may not be disclosed about a public official or
candidate."2 ' According to the Meildejohn theory of self-governance, 285
the amount of information that may be publicized about an individual
exceeds the amount of information needed to effectively order political
affairs. 286
Human nature also hinders avenging outing through this tort. A private
282. Unlike in the defamation context, the press can bootstrap itself into the public interest
exception under the private facts branch. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). To be fair,
courts generally require a nexus between the plaintiff and the matter reportedly in the public interests
to protect the dissemination. See Gilbert v. Medical Economic, 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981). This
requirement, however, is liberally conceived and applied.
Permissible publicity to information concerning either voluntary or involuntary public figures
is not limited to the particular events that arouse the interest of the public. [It] may
legitimately extend, to some reasonable degree, to further information concerning the
individual and to facts about him, which are not public and which, in the case of one who has
not become a public figure, would be regarded as an invasion of his purely private life.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D cmt. h (1977).
Newspaper columns on outing claim to engage in responsible journalism. For example, one
newspaper article mentioned the orientation of a Pentagon spokesperson. Its author threw crumbs to
responsibility by clarifying that he: a) was merely re-reporting what had already been revealed; and b)
recognized the ethical considerations of outing. This swipe at respectability falls short of the mark. The
column was a scant single paragraph, suggesting that its sole intent was to relay allegation and nothing
more. A more telling flaw is the conspiratorial wink with which the author opened his piece: "Did you
know that [] the Pentagon's spokesman during the recent Desert Storm War, is gay?" Mark Tremblay,
Magaines, CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
283. See, e g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 771 (1940)
(former child prodigy).
284. Post, supra note 107, at n.180 (citations omitted).
285. See supra note 131.
286. The ultimate disposition of a recent case should prove instructive on how courts view the
"offensiveness" of the disclosure that someone is gay. In Greenwood v. Taft, No. C-940066, 1995 WL
540221 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1995), an attorney instituted an invasion of privacy action against his
employer for revealing his sexual orientation. Plaintiff listed his male partner as the beneficiary of his
insurance and pension benefits. Staff members of his employer shared that information with persons
who had no need to know of the information. Id. at *5. The appellate court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's case, holding that "[w]e decline to hold as a matter of law that no facts could
exist, either under the Restatement definition of publicity or under an expanded interpretation, which
would demonstrate a ground for recovery under the disclosure tort." Id. at *7.
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facts plaintiff implicitly admits the truth of the published facts. Presumably,
one who objects to seeing life's intricacies splayed across a newspaper
would not relish increasing attention to that fact, its disclosure, or the truth
thereof through adjudication." 7 Plaintiff faces a no-win triple bind: ignore
the revelation; deny it and expose sexual activity to a microscopic lens in
the defamation context; admit it but subject sexual activity to no less
demeaning scrutiny in the privacy realm.
A successful private facts plaintiff perpetuates the characterization of
homosexuality as secret and objectionable, leaving the plaintiff vulnerable
to another form of degradation, this time self-imposed. The plaintiff must
essentially convince the court of the shamefulness of that person's very
existence and characterize the disclosure as "offensive." This exposes the
plaintiff to assorted psychological problems in addition to the dignitary
harm suffered by the disclosure. The plaintiff is made to feel like a traitor
to the homosexual "community" as well as to her or himself.
2. Revitalizing the Tort
Relatively minor internal reform could modify the private facts tort and
render it more sensitive to the disclosures that it claims to protect. Within
the outing context, this first requires the recognition that "privacy," or a
private fact, embraces much more than pure secrecy; the privacy of one is
more like solitude. Shared privacy can and should be recognized by the
court as deserving protection. A contrary view actually perpetuates the
closet as the proper milieu for lesbians and gay men. The major component
of privacy should not solely entail the nature of information revealed but
also the timing and circumstance of its disclosure. Thus, the revelation of
information that is integral to self-definition or that could endanger the
person about which it is revealed should be actionable.
Second, requiring the disclosure to offend a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities is problematic now and might pose increased
287. As Professor Kalven states, "the victims on whose behalf the privacy tort remedy was
designed will not in the real world elect to use it and.., those who will come forward with privacy
claims will very often have shabby, unseemly grievances and an interest in exploitation." Harry Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 338 (1966).
The man who feels outraged by publicity will[,] ... to stop or punish it, have to expose
himself to a great deal more publicity. [To] bring his persecutors to justice, he will have to
go through a process which will result in an exposure of his private affairs tenfold greater
than that originally made by the offending article,
Kramer, supra note 225, at 722 n. 126 (quoting Edwin L. Godkin, The Right to Privacy, 51 NATION
496 (1890)).
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difficulty to an outing plaintiff as tolerance or actual acceptance of
homosexuality grows. Viewing privacy this way again focuses too much on
the content of the publication as opposed to the publication itself. It should
matter less whether the content of the revelation offends sensibilities than
whether its stark disclosure, absent the approval or permission of the
proprietor of that information, is offensive. The human body is not
offensive; most find it beautiful. Nevertheless, the publication of one's nude
picture without consent could be actionable under a private facts tort. 88
Assuming arguendo that a court determines informational content to be the
proper focus of this tort, exposing homosexuality still causes harm.
Third, what is "of legitimate public interest" has been characterized as
a "community mores" test. This is particularly troublesome, because, unlike
in defamation, the tort has not backed away from defining the existence of
"public interest" as the trigger for the newsworthy defense. 89 One scholar
has even suggested that by definition, anything in the news fits the
description.29 The public interest or newsworthiness tests should not entitle
the media to print any and all information. To so hold would render the
private facts tort meaningless-a result that the court could not have
intended when the First Amendment crept into the private facts action.
The private facts cases that have reached the Supreme Court, Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn'91 and more recently, Florida Star v.
B.JF.,2 ' preserve the possibility of recovery for outing, notwithstanding
competing free speech concerns. While both cases appear to unwaveringly
protect First Amendment principles by limiting the denial of access to and
publication of official documents,293 Florida Star reiterated the tension
288. See, e.g., Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986) (ruling publication of
nude picture of mother and children not actionable as previous initial dissemination); McCabe v. Village
Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (nude bath photo of model with forged consent); Daily
Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (photo of woman with dress blown over
waist).
289. Unlike defamation, the court has not specifically restricted the ability of the media to
bootstrap itself into the defense. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
290. Kalven, supra note 252, at 336 (1966).
291. 420 U S. 469 (1975) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited suit for invasion of privacy
for publishing the name of a rape victim, as no tort liability can ensue for the public dissemination of
true information derived from official and public court records).
292. 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that, in suit for publishing the name of a rape victim, the
publication of true and lawfully obtained (although not public record) information may not be
proscribed unless statute is narrowly tailored to protect a state interest of the highest order, which state
did not meet).
293. See, e g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (striking state statute permanently barring
a grand jury witness from disclosing his or her own testimony); Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior Court
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between free press and personal privacy and carefully refrained from
holding that "truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected,
or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the states may
protect the individual from intrusion by the press[.]"294 It is difficult to
conceive of a more legitimate privacy interest than protecting a rape victim
from further degradation and possible danger. The ease with which
newsworthiness can be found supports a conclusion that recovery for
publishing another's sexual orientation would not be any better received.
Nevertheless, the material published in these cases was always either
lawfully obtained or a matter of public record, leaving to speculation
whether this protection remains if a publisher "taints" his information by
garnering it though bribery, intrusion, or other egregious means.
While Oliver Sipple might have already forsaken a right to the privacy
of his orientation, his case should not determine future ones. Defamation
protects against the dissemination of false information; the privacy tort is
supposed to protect against the dissemination of true but intrinsically
personal information. Clearly, the torts are not identical, and the court
should not abjure its responsibility by imposing the elaborate jurisprudence
of the First Amendment equally on both.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The final potential recovery theory for an outing plaintiff is intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a tort conceived to prevent intentional harm
to personality by violating rules of civility.295 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts, makes liable those "who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to anoth-
er[.]" 29 Given the potentially drastic consequences of publicly revealing
of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (finding error to close voir dire proceedings in
a criminal trial); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (striking state statute
barring press from trials where the defendant is accused of raping a minor); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ.
Co. 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (striking a state law criminalizing the publication of the name of a child
defendant in a criminal proceeding); Landmark Comm. Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (protecting
the defendant from criminal punishment for publishing true confidential proceedings of a judicial
inquiry board, as criticism of public officials "lies near the core of the First Amendment.").
294. 491 U.S. at 541.
295. Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HAMv. L. REV. 601, 616 (1990).
296. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORmS § 46 (1977). This conduct has also been characterized as
"so shocking and outrageous as to exceed all reasonable bounds of decency." See Callarama v.
Associates Dist. Corp., 69 Misc. 2d 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972); "extraordinarily vindictive," Flamm v.
Van Nierop, 56 Misc. 2d 1059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); or "atrocious and intolerable in a civilized
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another's homosexual orientation, outing does seem "utterly intolerable in
a civilized community. ' 2 97 Thus, in theory, it is actionable.293 But this
formulation is paradoxical in itself, as "rules of civility" are dynamic, inter-
active, and community-focused, and thus objective. The focus of this tort
should be subjective and intent-motivated. In practice, problems arise upon
consideration of the elements of the tort, the low level of success that this
action meets in court,299 and the plaintiff's status.
First, courts limit liability for this tort to situations where the defendant's
outrageous conduct transcends all bounds of decency. This presumably
renders the approach difficult for the outing plaintiff, who seeks to
vindicate mere words.3" As the law celebrates the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open and may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials," '' it is unlikely that name-calling alone would rise to the level of
outrageousness required of this tort.
This argument neatly disposes of the issue yet entirely ignores that words
hurt and command incredible power to invoke tangible action and force.
Depending on the particular enemy of the age, mere name-calling can incite
substantial violence to a plaintiffs emotional, economic, or physical well-
being. Within a hostile setting, revealing that a particular person is gay is
often treated as license to harm, particularly given the anti-homosexual
messages with which citizens are besieged.0 2 Just as in the privacy
medium, this element will prove problematic when society becomes more
society," MBM Corp. Inc. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980). One court has noted that this tort
is equivalent to the tort of outrage. See, e.g., Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 678 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1984).
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977).
298. Id.
299. This is so in practice, notwithstanding the gradual increased receptivity that has greeted the
tort since its inception, and the broader observation that the emotional distress tort should enjoy
increased viability in the future, especially in the First Amendment context. See SMOLLA, supra note
211, at § 11.0113].
300. SACK, supra note 233, at 475.
301. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
302. For example, publishing that "B is a drunken, incestuous lout who first enjoyed sex while in
an outhouse with his mother" would certainly damage B's reputation with a substantial part of the
community and would probably harm B's mental well-being. However, it is unlikely that B would be
in danger of much more than scorn or contempt from his community. By contrast, publishing that "B
is homosexual," whether "true" or not, would damage B's reputation with a substantial part of the
community, would probably harm B's mental well-being by being defined by others, and could very
well result in B's death. For discussion of self- and other-inflicted violence against gay men and
lesbians, see supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
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accepting of alternate sexual orientations, as what is "outrageous" derives
content from community norms.
Second, while required for all torts, causation and actual damages are
especially emphasized within the emotional distress actions. Although it is
unnecessary to prove physical injuries to recover, nominal damages will not
suffice. Severe emotional distress must ordinarily be sustained,3 3 catching
many tort plaintiffs between Scylla and Charybdis. If the plaintiff keeps his
or her same-sex orientation private due to intense shame or fear of reprisal,
its revelation will likely cause the level of emotional harm required to state
a cause of action. The harm might then go unredressed, as the plaintiff
presumably wishes to call no further attention to the issue and might feel
that the ensuing emotional distress was deserved. Conversely, if the
plaintiff keeps the same information personal through a desire for privacy
unaccompanied by shame or guilt, any emotional distress attending the
revelation would probably be limited to loss of dignity, privacy, or self-
definition. The harm may be no less real, but private facts jurisprudence
intimates that this type of harm, absent the other elements required to
sustain private facts recovery, would not be enough.
Once again, familiar constitutional doctrine thwarts redress through an
emotional distress action, at least in the public speech arena. A public
figure or official plaintiff who would be barred on First Amendment
grounds from a defamation recovery may not rework a failed defamation
claim as an infliction theory to escape media protection.30 4 The court
divines that to permit such alternative approaches would adulterate the free
speech rights protected by the First Amendment. Further, the philosophy of
this tort conveys the court's determination that within "political and social
discourse," characterizing a statement as "outrageous" is unprincipled,
subjective, and thus, constitutionally inappropriate.3 5
303. But see Post, supra note 295, at 633 (arguing that the element of "severe" emotional distress
is satisfied by a plaintiff's "simple recitation that he has been upset.").
304. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983) ('[Ilt would serve no useful purpose to treat separately the 'false light' cause of action nor
the 'outrageous conduct' doctrine sought to be injected into the trial, as the same First Amendment
considerations must be applied."); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Professor Smolla
posits, however, that "[n]othing in the First Amendment, for example, necessarily dictates a rule that
a defamation claim failure dictates a failure on the emotional distress claim." Rodney A. Smolla,
Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423
(1988).
305. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1988), rev'g Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d
1270 (4th Cir. 1986). The court evades whether its other characterizations in the dignitary torts,
including what is private versus what is public, is any less subjective.
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An arresting example of these doctrines figures in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell."6 Hustler printed an ad parody depicting the Reverend Jerry
Falwell as having first experienced sex with his mother in a Virginia
outhouse.3"' Falwell sued Hustler on a number of grounds, including
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 0 8 Although Falwell succeeded
on this claim at trial and on appeal,0 9 the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed.3"0 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion constructed the question as
involving First Amendment limits on a state's authority to award damages
supported by an emotional distress theory.31 t He concluded:
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication such as the one here
at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was
true.
-
2
Thus, if the outing victim is a public figure or official, the victim is
barred from recovery when the information is "true," involves a matter of
public concern, causes no injury beyond emotional distress, and occasions
no tort beyond infliction of emotional distress. 313 When the plaintiff suffers
an injury other than emotional distress or a tort other than intentional
infliction of emotional distress exists, the plaintiff might recover if (1) the
conduct is reckless or intentional regarding the risk of the non-emotional
distress, or (2) the defendant commits a tort other than intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and the conduct is intentional or reckless regarding
the legal interest that the tort protects.
If the speech does not involve a matter of public concern or if the outing
victim is a private figure but the issue is of public concern, the above
analysis applies, except that the New York Times actual malice standard
becomes mere negligence. If the speech does not involve an issue of public
concern, the common law will govern recovery. 14
306. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
307. Id. at 47.
308. Id. at 46.
309 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
310. 485 US. 46.
311. Id. at 50.
312 Id. at 56.
313. Id.
314. SMOLLA, supra note 211, at 11-22 & 11-23 (positing and elaborating on this framework and
remarking on the applicability of other First Amendment restraints on the tort, including the opinion
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2. Redirecting the Inquiry
It is difficult to prove that the mere publication of words is sufficient to
cause the level of personal harm required to sustain intentional infliction of
emotional distress. However, although that can be the effect of outing:
Oliver Sipple died in 1985, a victim of ostracism, alcoholism, and suicidal
depression.3"' A friend found him dead, alone in his room.316
Mr. Sipple's case is not shocking. The revelation of his orientation was
arguably incidental to the assassination attempt on then-President Ford. The
report did not aim to harm, embarrass, or intimidate Mr. Sipple in any way.
Not so with some militant factions that support outing. They purposely and
intentionally seek to disrupt lives, especially when the motive for the event
is to expose hypocrisy. Their response? A cavalier shrug and a flip
statement: "It does not hurt anyone. She is still making tons of money
playing tennis. He is still reaping in the big bucks as a star. Why are you
so worried about these millionaires anyway?" '
Once again, the First Amendment plays a key role in infliction cases. A
plaintiff who would be barred on First Amendment grounds from
proceeding in defamation cannot bring an action based on the same conduct
under this tort. Nevertheless, the torts compensate different injuries and
punish different conduct, which should recast the analysis under First
Amendment principles.
In the defamation context, the defendant's state of mind matters little
beyond knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, or what she
or he knew and when. Within the private facts tort, the defendant's intent
does not matter at all. Treating intentional infliction of emotional distress
the same as these other torts leaves no room for publications that stem from
original actual malice: mean-spirited desire and ill will toward the plaintiff.
Why let this type of defendant slip through when she or he already escapes
liability under the other torts? Why not let public figures and officials have
equal access to the action when they are already barred from redressing a
neutrally driven offense? The defendant should enjoy less protection where
bad motive impels the speech.
By allowing an outing plaintiff this vehicle for redress, the law would
privilege).
315. Dan Morain, Sorrow Trailed a Veteran Who Saved A President and Then Was Cast In an
Unwanted Spotlight, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1989, § 5, at 6.
316. Id.
317. See Yale Symposium, supra note 8.
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treat outing similarly to civil disobedience. The speech would not be
censored nor subject to prior restraint, except to the extent that its publisher
would self-censor. But the permitted speech itself would remain free,
entitling the speaker to fulfillment and the audience to informational access.
An outer not motivated by any ill-will would escape liability.
IV. FASHIONING AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE
Defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress protect individual dignity and preserve common rules of civility
that, when breached, endanger social interaction. With outing, social
interaction is severely threatened, as it is doubtful that community can even
exist without the retreat of privacy and its analog, intimacy. When filtered
through the First Amendment, the dignitary torts fall short of their purpose
through broad and clumsy categories that ineffectually respond to the harms
that outing occasions. The legal framework reduces relevant inquiries to
broad and ambiguous classifications: Is sexual orientation a fact or an
opinion? Is the plaintiff or the matter disseminated public or private? Is the
information true or false? While judicially manageable categories might
dispose of easy cases, the harder ones, where answers to binary questions
are more elusive, suffer the loss.
The assorted views of the scope and weight assigned to the First
Amendment impede objectively balancing the rights that compete within
outing, and scales are not calibrated finely enough to assist in determining
whether the court should protect outing speech under a given ideological
principle. The lip service paid to the balancing approach proves irrelevant
more often than not because, in practice, free speech usually trumps all
else."'
That such harm to dignity can be remedied by only the most cloistered
of victims suffering the most egregious invasions of privacy is astonishing
until one remembers the group with whom outing deals: gay men and
lesbians who have been and remain subjected to imposed and internal
inconsistencies throughout history. The frustration with which an outing
plaintiff is met in the courts is systemic-law imitates life and vice versa.
Nevertheless, space exists for a shift in the privacy/free speech paradigm
to provide real protection to the solid value of privacy. As Gerald Dworkin
notes:
318. For thoughtful discussions of this principle, see STANLEY FISH, supra note 95; CATHARINE
MAcKIrNON, ONLY WoRDs (1993).
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Lawyers are concerned not only with principles but also with problems...
if there are gaps in the law these can be identified[.] There are three
questions that the lawyer must ask: first, what is the meaning of privacy;
secondly, to what extent is this concept already protected by law, and thirdly,
if such protection is not adequate, what kind of law reform is required?319
Attempts to redraw the lines in specific legal arenas might allow a
plaintiff to vindicate an outing, but the issue suggests that the court more
seriously consider its present technology of justice to determine whether
instead of construing the same lines a little differently solely for the outing
issue, it should repaint them entirely. The court has already demonstrated
its commitment to the legal protection of privacy, within the Constitution
and its penumbras. 32" At some level, society must decide whether the
privilege to do as one wishes without impairing the rights of others should
supersede competing concerns, including the First Amendment, or be
subordinate to them.
Conversely, outing might be a phenomenon that in most cases should not
be legally enjoined, as doing so would muddle the quarter-century of
constitutional analysis with which the Supreme Court has infused common
law torts. This does not mean that legal or social reform cannot address the
problems that outing creates. If law functions more prescriptively than
descriptively, the ultimate solution is to legalize sodomy and same-sex
marriage: Other legal biases imposed due to orientation would become non-
existent and people would have less to lose, and would thus gain, when
orientation was revealed. And when society no longer condemns the
activity or the status, there would be no need for a legal action to redress
its revelation through defamation, privacy, or any other tort.
The response to outing could also emanate from ethics. The good that
has come of the outing debate in provoking discussion of sexual orientation
and ethics is salutary but does not justify the real harm inflicted on the real
people or their families. Publications could pledge to more carefully
consider what, why, and how they publish information that is either
essential to a person's self-identity or potentially damaging if revealed.
Publications committed to radical activism or the mighty dollar might be
disinclined to accept such self-imposed restraint, shifting part of the burden
to society.
Society must scrutinize its attitudes towards homosexuality, and admit
319. Gerald Dworkin, Privacy and the Law, in PRIVACY, supra note 103.
320. See supra note 101.
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that sexual orientation is a single facet of a complex life, to embrace the
enrichment caused by breaking down the institutional walls that separate
and divide. Only then will there be nothing to gain by outing, and no
money to be made by outing, no problems to redress by outing. Only then
will outing lose its sting, refocusing us on more important issues, such as
AIDS.
V. CONCLUSION
Outing disillusions. It reveals the conflict that ingrained institutions force
upon human lives. Heterosexuality is equated with normality, morality, the
right to publicity as to orientation, and the right to privacy as to sexual
conduct and sexual information. Homosexuality is equated with deviance,
immorality, and no right to be open as to orientation (epitomized by "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policies), yet no right to be private about sexual conduct,
information, or orientation. In essence, heterosexuality is equated with truth
and homosexuality with lies.
Casting the central issue in privacy terms risks perpetuating the myth that
gays better keep their sexuality hidden so as not to offend, shock, dismay,
or insult the rest of us, 2' but privacy as a keystone of liberalism far
exceeds informational content to include autonomy, decisions, dignity, and,
most important for the outing plaintiff, control over one's own perceived
identity. As a legal concept, privacy appears to be the best method through
which to institutionalize these ideas. If this epistemological approach is
flawed, it needs a substitute before meaningful' discussion can ensue.
Metaphorically, privacy should not imply a gag shoved in your mouth by
some third person. It implies, rather, a personal choice to cover one's own
mouth, at least partially, should that choice be made at all.
Outing is conflict-ridden. It rends ingrained ideas about sexuality and
cuts across as well as into ideological reserves. We sense that gay men and
lesbians are oppressed, but we want to keep that problem "over there," thus
reinforcing the self/other distinction. We oppress homosexual persons
ourselves, but are dismayed that oppression can come from within an
"other" group as well as without. This makes "them" more like "us;" this
makes "us" uncomfortable. Outing confronts us all, when we least expect
or desire it. Outing forces us to actually see things, and once seen, view
321. See RICHARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS, OUTING & OTHER CONTROVERSIES (1992) (marshalling
a strong defense in support of outing).
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them differently.3 22 Professor Kendall Thomas describes the heterosexual
commitment to ignorance about gay life:
The cloak of secrecy drawn around gay and lesbian lives in turn allows
heterosexuals to maintain "the epistemological privilege of unknowing." It is
precisely the "ignorance effect" that provides an ideological anchor for the
oppression of gays and lesbians, which the secrecy of the 'closet' has
historically aimed to mitigate. 3
Outing is unsettling. It strikes dissonant chords and is revolting yet
fascinating. "Liberals" find themselves simultaneously pulled in two
traditionally progressive directions-free speech and privacy. While we
recognize the salutary effects of outing, we might shudder at the prospect
of reducing discrimination tomorrow by forcing living victims to suffer it
today.
In failing to provide a means by which a victim of outing can vindicate
his or her pain, current law fails to protect rights and values that our
society cherishes. The existing legal structure, especially the private facts
action, could sustain relatively minor reform to allow law and society to
work within and through a community of people rather than outside of and
against a subset of individuals. Allowing legal redress of outing, although
a small method by comparison to the desired goal, is a step in the direction
to which this directive challenges us to move. Perhaps then we can begin
the herculean task of truly respecting difference, privacy, individualism, and
the many benefits that those values confer.
322. As Professor Law articulates,
Lesbians and gay men pose a formidable threat to the classic gender script. They deny the
inevitability of heterosexuality. They do not fit. Such persons, particularly if they are
comfortable with their sexuality and reasonably content and successful in their work and
family life, invite heterosexual people to explore whether their own sexual orientation is
innate, "freely chosen." or simply the socially comfortable course of least resistance.
Law, supra note 19, at 210.
323. Thomas, supra note 46, at 1455-56 (quoting EvE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE
CLOSET 5 (1990)).
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